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College Athletes as Employees:
An Overflowing Quiver
STEVEN L. WILLBORN*
This article discusses whether college athletes should be considered
employees under a broad range of employment statutes. The central
thesis is that, if college athletes are persistent, it is inevitable that
some of them, somewhere, sometime, will be found to be employees.
A major reason for this is that the basic rules for determining who is
an employee lean in college athletes’ favor across a broad range of
employment statutes, including private- and public-sector collective
bargaining laws and laws protecting individual employment rights.
College athletes are also likely to be classified as employees at some
point because there are literally hundreds of different employment
statutes. College athletes will have many independent opportunities
to present their claims. Finally, claims by the NCAA and its member
institutions to a special exemption for coverage under all these stat-
utes are weak. The analogy to antitrust law, where the NCAA has
been treated favorably, is inapt. Moreover, the courts will be reluc-
tant to create non-statutory exceptions to important state and federal
labor protections where the legislature has failed to do so.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Kain Colter, a football player at Northwestern University, is cur-
rently at the center of the discussion about whether college athletes1 are
* Judge Harry A. Spencer Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. Thanks to John
Burton, Rick Edwards, Tim Glynn, John Lenich, Michael Miranda, Richard Moberly, Ramona
Paetzold, Harvey Perlman, Jo Potuto, and Charlie Sullivan.
1. The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) preferred term is “student
athletes,” but in this context that tends to skew the discussion (which is undoubtedly one reason
65
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employees. He has filed a petition with the National Labor Relations
Board (“Board”) to recognize the College Athletes Players Association
(“CAPA”) as the union representative of football players at Northwest-
ern.2 Since the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or the “Act”)3
governs only “employees” who want to organize,4 the Board will have
to determine whether Northwestern football players fit within that cate-
gory as it decides whether to proceed with Colter’s petition. He won the
first skirmish in this battle when a regional director for the Board found
that the players were employees and ordered a union election.5
Colter’s petition threatens the long-standing position of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association that college athletes are stu-
dents, not employees.6 That contention is a fundamental feature of the
structure of college athletics; if it fails, the organizational structure of all
college athletics would have to be changed in many important ways.
Perhaps most significantly, a decision that college athletes are employ-
ees would likely mean that the entire financial structure of college ath-
letics would have to be rethought and reconstructed.7
the NCAA prefers the term). WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE
CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 69 (1995). Walter Byers, long-term executive director
of the NCAA, in his memoirs, said the term “student athlete” was crafted in response to fears that
college athletes might be classified as employees by courts and others. I plan to use the more
accurate term “college athlete.” The people I am discussing participate in intercollegiate athletics,
so they are “college” “athletes.” Whether they are primarily students or employees, or some
combination, is the issue I am addressing.
2. Petition, Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359 (Jan. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.employerlaborrelations.com/files/2014/02/Northwestern-RC-petition1.pdf (last visited
Sept. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Northwestern Univ. Petition].
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
4. Id. §§ 152(3), 158 (defining “employee” and specifying employee rights protected under
the Act).
5. Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2014) (decision finding
that players receiving scholarships are employees and ordering election within the bargaining unit)
[hereinafter Northwestern Univ. Decision]. The National Labor Relations Board has since agreed
to review the Regional Director’s decision and has invited interested parties to file amicus briefs
to inform its decision. Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359 (Apr. 24, 2014) (order
granting Northwestern’s request for review of the decision); Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No.
13-RC-121359 (May 12, 2014) (invitation to file briefs, listing six questions the Board would like
interested parties to address).
6. See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 1, at 69 (“[A] serious, external threat . . . prompted R
most of the colleges to unite and insist with one voice that, grant-in-aid or not, college sports still
were only for ‘amateurs.’ That threat was the dreaded notion that NCAA athletes could be
identified as employees.”).
7. See, e.g., RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE $6 BILLION HEIST: ROBBING
COLLEGE ATHLETES UNDER THE GUISE OF AMATEURISM 3 (2012), available at http://
www.ncpanow.org/news/articles/body/6-Billion-Heist-Study_Full.pdf (noting that the average
annual fair market value of men’s college football and basketball players is $114,153 and
$265,827, respectively; currently, they receive 17% and 8% of those amounts, respectively); Karl
Borden, College Football Players Deserve a Share of the Spoils, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2014, 7:13
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303848104579308401524906962
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Despite its significance, Colter’s petition is quite narrow. It raises
the issue in one narrow circumstance—whether football players at a
major private university are “employees” under the NLRA.8 This is one
arrow in Colter’s and CAPA’s quiver, but if they ultimately lose on this
claim, then they have many other arrows in reserve. The “employee”
issue can be raised in a myriad of other ways. For example, football
players at public universities could seek union representation under state
collective bargaining laws,9 any athlete could claim compensation for
overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act,10 an injured athlete could
seek compensation under a state workers’ compensation statute,11 an
athlete subject to sexual or racial harassment could file a claim under a
state or federal employment discrimination law,12 or an athlete could
claim a violation of the state’s wage payment laws.13 A determination by
the National Labor Relations Board in Northwestern’s favor (or Col-
ter’s) would have virtually no legal effect on the outcome in any of these
other areas.14 Instead, the “employee” issue could be raised indepen-
dently in each of these areas (and many others). And, of course, in those
areas that are subject to state law, there is no logical or legal reason that
the result in one state must match the result in another state. Because of
(proposing that universities contribute 25% of gross football revenues to a trust fund authorized to
make post-eligibility payments to players); Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-
athletes.html (proposing minimum salaries of $25,000/year for players and other changes to
narrow the discrepancies between returns to players and returns to others, including coaches and
universities).
8. See Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 2 (“The Petitioner contends that
football players . . . receiving . . . scholarships . . . are ‘employees’ within the meaning of the
Act . . . . The Employer, on the other hand, asserts that its football players receiving . . .
scholarships are not ‘employees’ under the Act.”).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.A.
11. See infra Part V.B.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part V.
14. For several reasons, a decision under the NLRA would have especially limited legal effect
in other areas. First, the NLRA has a unique set of statutory and non-statutory exclusions from its
circular definition of “employee.” See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
Second, the policy reasons underlying the determination are different for collective rights than for
individual rights. See id. § 151. And, third, the National Labor Relations Board has broader
discretion in deciding the issue than courts would in other contexts. See id. § 160.
Two caveats, however. First, in other areas, the particular statutory definitions of “employee”
are often based on the common-law definition. When that is the case, decisions in one area may
well influence decisions in other areas, but there would still be differences at the margins given
differences in statutory language and statutory purpose. See infra Part III, V.B. Second, in college
sports, treating college athletes as non-employees is part of the foundation for an entire cultural
and financial infrastructure. This may make courts wary about finding employee status, given the
ramifications. As a result, individual courts may be reluctant to be the first mover, which could
encourage more uniform opinions.
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Colter’s highly publicized petition, most of the commentary about
whether college athletes are employees has focused on unionization and
the NLRA. But there are many other arrows in this quiver.
Because so many arrows are in the quiver, if they pursue it persis-
tently, Colter and CAPA (or others) are likely to get some college ath-
letes labeled as employees for some purposes, somewhere, sometime.
This article is about why that is likely to be true. This article is not about
how the NCAA should or will respond when one or more college ath-
letes are determined to be employees.15 That is another article, and a
longer one. The main point of this article, however, is that the NCAA
should plan for that day because it is likely to arrive sooner or later.
II. COLLEGE ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES—ORGANIZING
THE WILDERNESS
The employment relationship is regulated by literally thousands of
different local, state, and federal laws.16 As a result, the issue of whether
college athletes are employees can arise in many different contexts.
Although influential commentators have called for a uniform definition
of employee,17 that has never occurred. And for good reason. The pre-
cise coverage of an employment statute depends on the particular pur-
15. An interesting aspect of the current changes within the NCAA, however, is that while
they respond to certain pressing issues within the organization, on the narrow issue of whether
college athletes are employees, they do not tend to cut in any particular direction. See infra note
314. R
16. For example, hundreds of laws apply in the relatively narrow area of employment
discrimination alone. At the federal level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the central
statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2012). It prohibits discrimination because of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin. But a number of other federal statutes prohibit other types of
discrimination, such as discrimination based on age, genetic information, or disability. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to ff-10 (2012); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). Other federal statutes overlap with Title VII in
substance but differ in procedure and remedy. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (2012); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012); Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). In addition to these federal statutes, literally hundreds of state and local
laws prohibit employment discrimination. These laws often increase the types of statuses
protected (many prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and marital status, unlike
Title VII) and the number of employers covered (many cover employers with fewer than fifteen
employees, unlike Title VII). In addition, these state and local laws always provide their own
procedures and remedies.
Ironically, the failure of the NLRA is one of the main reasons there are so many laws
regulating the employment relationship. In a classic article, Professor Clyde Summers pointed out
that the main goal of the NLRA was to protect workers through collective bargaining instead of
legislation. But when collective bargaining failed to achieve that goal, the courts and legislatures
began to step in to guard worker rights. Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A
Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 9–11 (1988).
17. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON
THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT 63 (1994) (“The definition of
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA104.txt unknown Seq: 5  4-DEC-14 9:07
2014] COLLEGE ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES 69
pose of that statute; a statute that is intended primarily to ensure a basic
income for low-wage workers may well define “employee” differently
than a statute designed to provide for unpaid leaves of absence.18
This results in an unruly wilderness of rules for determining who is
an employee, but this article will not examine every tree in that wilder-
ness. Instead, it will provide a rough guide through the wilderness by
dividing the territory into state and federal laws governing collective
employee rights and state and federal laws providing individual
employee rights.
The part of the woods being explored by Kain Colter, federal law
governing collective rights, is the least complicated category. The
National Labor Relations Act is a preemptive federal law governing col-
lective employee rights in the private sector.19 The meaning of employee
under the NLRA will be discussed in Section III below.
State laws that govern collective rights are more diverse. Most
states have laws that provide a bargaining structure for state and local
public employees.20 Although these laws tend to be based on the
National Labor Relations Act,21 they differ in many important ways,
including in their definition of “employee.” Section IV below will con-
sider possible coverage of college athletes under state collective bargain-
ing laws.
Finally, local, state, and federal laws protecting individual
employee rights are even more diverse. Some of these laws, such as
those prohibiting discrimination, can be very similar at the local, state,
and federal levels.22 In other areas, such as ERISA, federal law may
preempt the area.23 Still other areas, such as wage payment and workers’
employee in labor, employment, and tax law should be modernized, simplified, and
standardized.”).
18. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543–44 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act should drive the definition
of “employee”).
19. Federal employees also have collective rights and those rules may apply to college
athletes at the military academies. See Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.
§ 7101 (2012) (finding “labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service [to be] in
the public interest”). But I will not discuss that set of issues.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Developments in the Law—Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1680 (1984)
(“Most states have adopted [an] . . . approach [to public sector bargaining] modeled on the
NLRA.”).
22. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 395 (5th
ed. 2012) (“Despite [the] multitude of [local, state, and federal employment discrimination laws,]
only five basic models exist for proving employment discrimination . . . .”).
23. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2012) (“[T]his
chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan . . . .”).
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compensation, may be governed only by state law.24 There are literally
thousands of laws that fall into this category. This category will be con-
sidered in Section V below.
III. COLLEGE ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES UNDER THE NLRA
Kain Colter wants to be represented by a union.25 He has invoked
the processes of the NLRA to get his union recognized and, in turn, to
force Northwestern University to bargain with it.26 But the NLRA only
governs relationships between employers and employees.27 So a prelimi-
nary and central question is whether Colter and his football teammates
are “employees” within the meaning of the NLRA.28
The Regional Director29 in the Northwestern case found, first, that
Colter was an employee within the meaning of the NLRA and, second,
that he was not excluded from coverage because he was “primarily” a
student.30 These are the two issues in the case and, although the
Regional Director’s decision will not be the final word,31 the opinion
presents the issues well.
The first issue addressed by the Regional Director was whether
Colter was an employee within the meaning of the NLRA. As is com-
mon in employment statutes, the definition of “employee” within the
NLRA is not very helpful. The main part of the definition is completely
circular: “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . .”32
Although this language does not provide much traction, the Board and
the courts have interpreted it to call on the common-law definition of
employee: A worker is an employee when she “performs services for
another, under the other’s control or right of control, and in return for
24. See generally WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Gregory K.
McGillivary et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011); ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, 1 LARSON’S WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAW § 125.02 (2014 ed.) (providing an overview of how different states govern
workers’ compensation disputes).
25. See Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 2.
26. See Northwestern Univ. Petition, supra note 2.
27. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
28. From now on, I use “Colter” as shorthand for the entire group of football players.
29. Pursuant to section 3(b) of the NLRA, the Board has delegated most issues involving
union elections to its twenty-six regional directors. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b); NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS
BD., NLRB RULES AND REGULATIONS MANUAL pt. 101, § 101.20, available at http://
www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1717/Manual-Part%20101%20.pdf
(last visited Sept. 18, 2014) [hereinafter NLRB RULES].
30. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 2.
31. In rare cases, the Board reviews the decisions of regional directors; this is one of those
rare cases. See infra note 98. R
32. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
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payment.”33 The Regional Director in Colter’s case relied on this defini-
tion to find that Colter was an employee:34 he performed valuable ser-
vices for Northwestern,35 under “strict and exacting control,”36 and he
received compensation in return.37
The Regional Director also found that Northwestern football play-
ers who were not on scholarship (the “walk-ons”) were not employees.38
The main reason for this finding was that the walk-ons did not receive
compensation for their athletic services.39 This part of the decision is
important because it means that college athletes at most private universi-
ties are not employees under the NLRA and, hence, would not be able to
unionize.40 For example, athletic scholarships are not permitted at some
NCAA Division I institutions41 or at any NCAA Division III institu-
tions.42 This part of the decision means that much of the concern about
the effect of this opinion is misplaced; the Northwestern decision is
actually favorable to most universities opposed to unionization efforts
by college athletes. Of the 611 private colleges and universities in the
NCAA,43 about sixty percent are in Division III, which does not award
33. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205–06 (2000); see also NLRB v. Town & Country
Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995).
34. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 13–18.
35. Id. at 14 (the Northwestern football team generated about $235 million in revenues
between 2003–2012, in addition to the “immeasurable positive impact” on alumni giving and
student applications).
36. Id. at 15.
37. Id. at 14 (“[T]he monetary value of [the] scholarships totals as much as $76,000 per
calendar year [resulting] in . . . total compensation in excess of one quarter of a million dollars”
for players who were on the team for the full four or five years.).
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. The Regional Director also noted that the walk-ons were subject to less control. Id.
40. In a letter to all presidents of NCAA Division I football schools, the President of
Northwestern said that, if the Regional Director’s opinion was ultimately upheld, “‘scholarship
athletes at any private institution could similarly be represented by a union for the purposes of
collective bargaining.’” Melanie Trottman, 5 Things Northwestern is Telling Other Football
Schools About Unions, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2014, 8:29 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2014/04/15/5-things-northwestern-is-telling-other-football-schools-about-unions. That
is incorrect. As indicated in the article, under the ruling, college athletes at most private
institutions would not be employees under the NLRA. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying R
text.
41. Most notably, athletic scholarships are not permitted at the eight Division I institutions in
the Ivy League. See Prospective Student-Athletes Information, IVY LEAGUE, http://
www.ivyleaguesports.com/information/psa/index (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
42. NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIV. III MANUAL art. 15.01.3 (2013) (“A member institution
shall not award financial aid to any student on the basis of athletics leadership, ability,
participation or performance.”).
43. The NLRA applies only to private employers. See National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012).
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scholarships.44 As a result, college athletes at those institutions would
not be able to unionize under the reasoning of Northwestern. Of course,
the furor is not about most of the institutions in the NCAA, but rather
about the relatively few institutions, like Northwestern University,
where college athletics is big business. There is some irony within that
narrower category too, however; about ninety percent of the universities
in that category are public institutions that are not governed by the
NLRA or the Regional Director’s decision at all.45
The second issue addressed by the Regional Director was whether
Colter was “primarily” a student and thus exempted from the normal
definition of employee under the NLRA.46 The NLRA explicitly
excludes several categories of workers who might otherwise be thought
to be employees, including agricultural workers, independent contrac-
tors, and supervisors.47 In addition, the Board has carved out several
non-statutory exceptions to the Act’s coverage. Managers and confiden-
tial employees, for example, have been excluded from the NLRA’s defi-
nition of “employee” even though they are clearly common-law
employees and are not specifically excluded by the statutory defini-
tion.48 Students are another of the non-statutory exceptions to the Act’s
coverage.
In Brown University, the National Labor Relations Board held that
graduate students at the university who worked as teaching assistants,
research assistants, and proctors were not “employees” under the
NLRA.49 The Board held that they were “primarily students [with] a
primarily educational, not economic, relationship with their univer-
44. The membership in the NCAA, as of 2009, is as follows:
Public Private
Division I 220 113
Division II 154 137
Division III 89 357
TOTAL 463 607
NCAA, 2008–09 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 15, 17, 21 (2009), available at http://www.ncaa
publications.com/p-3877-2008-09-ncaa-membership-report.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2014). This
overcounts the private institutions that would be subject to unionization efforts under
Northwestern because the private institutions include the members of the Ivy League. See supra
note 41. R
45. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. R
46. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 18–20.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
48. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (managerial employees are not
“employees” under the NLRA); NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454
U.S. 170, 190 (1981) (confidential employees are not “employees” under the NLRA).
49. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004). From now on, I will use “teaching
assistants” as shorthand for the entire group at issue in Brown University.
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sity.”50 Kain Colter and his teammates are all students, so the question
was whether they, too, would fit within the Brown University exception
for those whose relationship with a university is “primarily
educational.”51
In Brown University, several aspects of the relationship between the
teaching assistants and the university led the Board to conclude that the
relationship was “primarily educational.”52 First, the Board emphasized
that one had to be a student enrolled in the university to be a teaching
assistant.53 The Board also noted that the time the teaching assistants
devoted to teaching was “limited” and that their “principal time commit-
ment” was focused on obtaining a degree.54 Second, the Board found
that teaching assistant duties were “part and parcel of the core elements”
of their degree program.55 For most of the teaching assistants, the Board
found, they would not get their degrees until they had successfully com-
pleted their duties as teaching assistants.56 Third, and similarly, the
Board found that the teaching assistants were closely and personally
supervised by faculty members; this close and “intensely personal” rela-
tionship between student and faculty member supported the conclusion
that the duties were primarily educational in nature.57 Fourth, the Board
relied on two aspects of the funding for teaching assistants: (1) the funds
came from the university’s financial aid budget rather than its instruc-
tional budget, and (2) teaching assistants generally received the same
amount as other graduate students who had fellowships but did not
teach.58 Finally, the Board worried that unionization might infringe on
the academic freedom of teaching assistants; the Board worried about
the right to speak freely in the classroom and about other issues that
intertwined with academic freedom, such as class size, time, and
location.59
The Regional Director in Northwestern held that the non-statutory
exclusion for students simply did not apply to Colter and his teammates
because “the players’ football-related duties are unrelated to their aca-
demic studies unlike the graduate assistants whose teaching and research
duties were inextricably related to their graduate degree requirements.”60
50. Id. at 487.
51. See Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 18–20.
52. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487.
53. Id. at 488.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 488.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 489–90.
58. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 489.
59. Id. at 490.
60. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 18.
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Nevertheless, the Regional Director went on to consider the Brown fac-
tors and concluded that they would not exclude Colter from coverage
under the NLRA even if they did apply.61
On the first factor, the Regional Director recognized that Colter had
to be a student to be a football player,62 but noted that Brown required
the teaching assistants to be “primarily” students.63 Based on the evi-
dence before him, the Regional Director estimated that Colter devoted
about twice as much time to football as he did to attending classes.64
Based on that, he said that Colter was not “primarily” a student who
“‘spen[t] only a limited number of hours performing [his] athletic
duties.’”65 The Regional Director’s comparison of time devoted to foot-
ball versus time “attending classes” does not seem quite fair. The time
students spend on academics is not limited to time spent in the class-
room. The Regional Director noted this, but still concluded that North-
western football players spend “many more hours” on football than they
do on their studies.66 This more balanced and modest claim is supported
by NCAA statistics, which show that, during the season, football players
at the major college programs spend 43.3 and 38.0 hours on football and
academics, respectively.67
On this factor, like the others, college athletes vary widely in the
actual number of hours spent on athletics. Athough the NCAA has rules
61. Id.
62. Although not noted by the Regional Director, the NCAA has rules which may require
college athletes to be more connected to academics than other students who are not athletes. For
example, college athletes have to meet initial eligibility standards that may be higher than a
university’s normal admission standards, and it requires progress toward a degree that may not be
required of other students. NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 14.3–.4 (2013)
[hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL].
63. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 18.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id. (quoting Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 488 (2004)).
66. Id. One reviewer noted that many of the hours football players devote to their sport are
voluntary. Under NCAA rules, Northwestern must limit the hours it can demand of football
players for athletically related activities. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. This R
distinction, however, has no traction in employment law. If an “employer knows or has reason to
believe that the work is being performed, he must count the time as hours worked.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 785.12 (2013).
[I]t is the duty of the management to exercise its control and see that the work is not
performed if it does not want it to be performed. It cannot sit back and accept the
benefits without compensating for them. The mere promulgation of a rule against
such work is not enough. Management has the power to enforce the rule and must
make every effort to do so.
Id. § 785.13.
67. NCAA RESEARCH, DIVISION I RESULTS FROM THE NCAA GOALS STUDY ON THE
STUDENT-ATHLETE EXPERIENCE 17–21 (2011), available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/
files/DI_GOALS_FARA_final_1.pdf (the research also shows that seventy percent of football
players report spending as much or more time on football during the off-season).
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that provide a uniform maximum across sports and institutions on the
time that can be spent on “countable athletically related activities,”68 the
rules have so many exceptions and loopholes that they have little practi-
cal impact on the actual number of hours college athletes devote to ath-
letics.69 Instead, in practice, major-college football players are at the
upper end of a broad range in time commitment to their sport, while
college athletes in different sports70 and at different universities71 vary
considerably on this factor. Many, like Colter, probably devote sufficient
time to have this factor cut in favor of employee status under the NLRA,
but other college athletes may more closely resemble the teaching assis-
tants in Brown.72 It is, of course, the actual time spent on athletics that
will govern this result, not the formal NCAA rules.73
68. “Countable athletically related activities” are limited to no more than twenty hours per
week during a sport’s season and eight hours per week out of season. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
supra note 62, art. 17.1.6.1–6.2. R
69. This occurs because the NCAA has narrow definitions of what “counts” as “athletically
related activities.” For example, a game day counts as three hours no matter how long it takes (and
it generally takes more than that). Id. art. 17.1.6.3.2; see Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note
5, at 7–9 & n.17 (describing time spent by Northwestern football players on a game day and the
day before; total time actually spent was more than 24 hours, but the NCAA counted only 4.8 of
them as “athletically related”). Many intensive activities, such as preseason practices and
voluntary weight training, do not count at all. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 62, art. R
17.1.6.3.5 (the hour limitations do not apply when the preseason practice occurs before the first
day of classes or the first scheduled contest); id. art. 17.02.1 (only “required” athletic activities
count toward the hour limitations); id. art. 17.02.13 (defining non-required “voluntary” athletically
related activities).
70. NCAA research reports that while football players at major college programs spend 43.3
hours per week on football during the season, male athletes in sports other than football, baseball,
and basketball spend approximately 32.0 hours on athletic activities (or ten hours fewer per week).
NCAA RESEARCH, supra note 67, at 17. This average, of course, conceals variance within those R
other sports; athletes in some sports devote even less time to their sport.
71. For example, football players at Division III colleges and universities spend about ten
hours fewer each week on athletic activities than their peers at major-college football institutions
(33.1 hours vs. 43.3 hours, in season). Id. On the athletics vs. academics comparison more
directly, while major-college baseball, (male) basketball, and football players all spend more time
on athletic activities than on academics, the reverse is true for all college athletes at Division III
colleges and universities. Id. at 19 (Division III college athletes spend up to 14.1 hours more each
week during the season on academics than on athletic activities).
72. Even under the NCAA’s rules, when the maximums are approached, the time devoted to
athletics is more than “limited,” although it would still be possible to have a “principal time
commitment” elsewhere. But, as indicated in the text, it is certainly possible that college athletes
in some sports at some institutions fall on the other side of this divide.
73. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01 cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft,
April 8, 2014) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW] (“The underlying economic realities of
the relationship, rather than any designation . . . of the relationship in an agreement . . . , determine
whether a particular individual is an employee.”); id. § 1.01 reporters’ notes cmt. g (“The test for
employee status is a functional one; it ordinarily does not turn on how the parties characterize
their relationship.”). In Northwestern, the Regional Director followed the courts in looking at the
college athletes’ actual experience rather than formal rules in determining this aspect of Colter’s
case. See Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 18:
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On the second factor, the Regional Director found that Colter’s
duties as a football player were not as closely related to academics as the
duties of the teaching assistants in Brown.74 In contrast to Brown, foot-
ball players did not receive academic credit for playing football, nor was
football a requirement for obtaining a degree.75 Rather, the Regional
Director said that, given the large scholarships received by the players,
the relationship was primarily economic, rather than academic.76 The
Regional Director also found that Colter was different than teaching
assistants because his interaction with faculty was more limited.77
Faculty members did not oversee Colter’s football activities at all; foot-
ball coaches are not members of the academic faculty.78 This meant both
that Colter was less student-like than teaching assistants and that there
was not likely to be any adverse effect on academic freedom and aca-
demic decisions because of classification as an employee,79 which was
one of the worries in Brown.80
On these factors, the Regional Director focused on Colter’s particu-
lar experience as a college athlete.81 While the NCAA and its member
colleges and universities certainly pitch the experience of college athlet-
ics as an important part of a student’s overall educational experience,82
the Regional Director paid no attention to those general claims and,
The players spend 50 to 60 hours per week on their football duties . . . prior to the
start of the academic year and an additional 40 to 50 hours per week . . . during the
. . . football season. Not only is this more hours than many undisputed full-time
employees work at their jobs, it is also many more hours than the players spend on
their studies. . . . [I]t cannot be said that they are ‘primarily students’ . . . .





79. Id. This result seems justified because Colter’s role simply does not involve much
academic freedom. But if the general concept does apply, it would seem to cut in the opposite
direction than in Brown. The primary reason Colter gives for seeking unionization is to have a
greater voice in the debates about college athletics. Thus the goal, and probably the result if he is
successful, is to permit him to speak more freely and openly on these issues.
80. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 (2004).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 62, art. 1.3 (“The competitive athletics R
programs of member institutions are designed to be a vital part of the educational system. A basic
purpose of [the NCAA] is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body . . . .”); Robert J. Sternberg, College
Athletics: Necessary, Not Just Nice to Have, BUSINESS OFFICER, http://www.nacubo.org/Business
_Officer_Magazine/Business_Officer_Plus/Bonus_Material/College_Athletics_Necessary_Not_
Just_Nice_to_Have.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2014); see also Rohith A. Parasuraman, Unionizing
NCAA Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 744–45 (2007) (positing that
“[i]f the NLRB were to view participation in sports as part of the academic experience, [it] might
then find that an athlete is a student rather than an ‘employee,’” because if one views the purpose
of attending college as advancing into some profession, participation in sports with the hope of
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instead, focused on the specific experience of Colter as a football player
at Northwestern.83 That focus indicates, again, that there will be variance
across different sports and different universities. For example, at some
universities, coaches are actually faculty (professors) and athletes can
earn academic credit for participating in their sports.84
Finally, the Regional Director considered how Colter was paid.85 In
Brown, the Board noted that the teaching assistants were paid out of the
financial aid budget and received the same amount as others who did not
teach.86 In addition, their compensation did not depend on the quality of
their work.87 The Regional Director distinguished Colter’s compensation
on each of these points.88 Colter was paid only because he had agreed to
play football; if he did not play football, his compensation would be
revoked; and diligent attendance was required to retain his scholarship.89
Again, this result for Colter does not signal the same result for all
athletes at all schools. For example, since 2011, the NCAA has permit-
ted member schools to offer multi-year scholarships.90 That weakens the
tie between money and athletic performance and, thus, weakens the
claim for employee status. That being said, there are differences both
within schools and across schools in how multi-year scholarships func-
tion.91 As a result, there will certainly be differences between schools in
how they fare on this factor and often there will be differences at the
same school for athletes participating in different sports or even for dif-
ferent athletes in the same sport.92 Moreover, at the vast majority of
becoming a professional athlete “is only superficially different than the pursuit of medicine or law
as a profession”).
83. See Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 3.
84. MICHAEL A. MIRANDA & THOMAS S. PASKUS, NCAA, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND
PERSPECTIVES OF NCAA FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVES 24 (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/FAR_STUDY_Report_final.pdf (fifteen to sixteen percent
of NCAA Division I institutions permit academic credit for participating in athletics; about one-
quarter of Division II and III institutions do so).
85. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 20.
86. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 489.
87. Id. at 490 n.27.
88. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 20.
89. Id.
90. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 62, art. 15.3.3. R
91. Mark Dent, Colleges, Universities Slow to Offer Multiyear Athletic Scholarships,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 19, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/sports/Pitt/
2013/05/19/Colleges-universities-slow-to-offer-multiyear-athletic-scholarships/stories/20130519
0222. Of 82 NCAA Division I universities responding to a survey, 16 offered more than ten
multiyear scholarships, 32 offered between one and ten, and 34 offered none; only one university
offered four-year scholarships to all of its athletes.
92. In Colter’s case, Northwestern did offer four-year scholarships, but the promise was not
firm. The scholarship could be revoked for a variety of reasons. Northwestern Univ. Decision,
supra note 5, at 4 (listing seven reasons for revocation of the scholarship). Ironically, the Regional
Director relied on the revocability of the scholarships to support his finding that they constituted
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colleges, athletics is not funded solely from athletic department funds;
funds may also be provided from elsewhere in the university.93 Thus, at
most schools, the extent of the tie between funding and the particular
task performed is stronger than it was in Brown University, but weaker
than it was in Northwestern, where Colter’s entire scholarship came
from athletic department funds.
In sum, the Regional Director held, first, that Brown simply did not
apply because Colter’s football duties were so unrelated to his academic
studies.94 For that reason alone, Colter the football player was not “pri-
marily” a student. Second, the Regional Director found that, even if
Brown did apply, Colter would properly be classified as an employee
because all four of the Brown factors pointed in that direction.95 Yet, the
Northwestern decision is quite nuanced. Its rationale excludes more col-
lege athletes from employee status than it includes.96 Additionally, its
holding is closely limited to the facts in Colter’s case; even for athletes
within the general universe occupied by Colter—at private universities
in major conferences—the Regional Director’s rationale will have vary-
ing effects.97
Northwestern appealed the Regional Director’s decision to the full
National Labor Relations Board.98 The outcome there is uncertain. On
the one hand, Colter’s claim is even stronger before the Board than it
was before the Regional Director. The Regional Director was bound to
follow the Brown decision, which is current Board precedent. The Board
is not bound by Brown, and there is strong reason to believe that the
compensation; their revocability supported his finding that the scholarships were “in exchange for
athletic services.” Id. at 15.
93. See Steve Berkowitz et al., Most NCAA Division I Athletic Departments Take Subsidies,
USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/
ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/ (twenty-three of 228 NCAA Division I athletic departments
generated enough money to cover all athletic expenses; only seven athletic departments reported
no revenue from non-athletic sources).
94. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 18.
95. Id. at 18–20.
96. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. R
97. Northwestern also claimed that Colter was a temporary employee and, thus, not eligible to
unionize. The Regional Director rejected this claim without extended discussion. Northwestern
Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 20–21. Given the length and extent of service to the University
(four or five years, more than 40 hours per week), the claim of temporary employment was quite
weak on the facts. It was also weak legally. See, e.g., Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 166
(1999) (finding that workers with set terms of from three to seven years were not temporary
employees).
98. Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359 (Apr. 9, 2014) (request for review of
decision). The Board rarely reviews regional director decisions in election cases. NLRB RULES,
supra note 29, § 102.67(c) (the Board will grant review only for “compelling reasons”). But in R
this case, it exercised its discretionary authority to review the decision.
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current Board may be inclined to return to an analysis that would be
more favorable to Colter than Brown.
Brown overturned a prior decision that found that teaching assis-
tants at New York University were employees under the NLRA.99 In
New York University, the Board emphasized the basic facts of their
employment—that they “perform services under the control and direc-
tion of the Employer, and they are compensated for these services by the
Employer”100— and it rejected the argument that they should not be
considered employees because their work was “primarily educa-
tional.”101 Most of the discussion was the mirror image of the discussion
in Brown. The Board emphasized that the teaching assistants fit within
the generous common-law definition of employee and did not fall within
any of the explicit exclusions in the NLRA itself.102 The Board recog-
nized that the teaching assistants would receive educational benefits
from their work, but pointed out how that was not inconsistent with
employee status.103 In any event, the Board noted that working as a
teaching assistant was not a requirement to obtain a degree nor a part of
the formal curriculum.104
The New York University result and analysis is more than mere
history because the Board recently found “compelling reasons for recon-
sideration of the decision in Brown University,” suggesting that it might
return to the more generous (for Colter) New York University approach
to the issue of employee status.105 Although the Board signaled its inten-
tion to reconsider Brown, it has not yet had occasion to do so.106 Thus,
under current Board doctrine, Colter has a strong claim that he should be
classified as an employee of Northwestern University; the Regional
Director issued a careful opinion finding as much. Additionally, his
claim would be strengthened if the Board were to revert back to the New
99. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004).
100. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206 (2000).
101. Id. at 1207.
102. Id. at 1206.
103. Id. at 1207.
104. Id. The Board did exclude some graduate assistants from the bargaining unit. It held that
graduate research assistants who were funded solely by external grants were not employees. Id. at
1209 n.10. Although interesting, this should not have any effect on college athletes because they
all receive compensation directly from the university and not from outside sources.
105. N.Y. Univ., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 1 (Oct. 25, 2010). In this case, the Regional Director
relied on Brown to dismiss a petition without a hearing from graduate teaching and research
students. Id. The Board signaled its intent to reconsider Brown when remanding the case to the
Regional Director for a hearing. Id. at 2.
106. This reconsideration has taken quite some time in part because of the political controversy
over the Board’s membership. See Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d,
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that the NLRB lacked a quorum to act because three members
were improperly appointed by the President under the Recess Appointments Clause of the
Constitution).
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York University analysis, which it has hinted it may do.107
On the other hand, although Brown and New York University are
the best Board precedent on the issue now, the Board could carve out an
entirely new non-statutory exception for college athletes. Analytically,
the Board could point to significant differences between teaching assis-
tants and college athletes that call for a different analysis and, maybe,
for a broad exception. Teaching assistants were graduate students;
almost all college athletes are undergraduates. The financial structures
are enormously different. The potential disruption to the existing sys-
tems—financial, regulatory, etc.—would be greater for college athletics.
Historically, a new exception from employee status would not be
unprecedented. The Board has already created exceptions for managers
and confidential employees108 and, indeed, that is one way to view
Brown itself. Finally, the Board may feel political pressure to create
such a new exception. Classifying college athletes as employees would
create a firestorm that will be fed by universities and the NCAA, but
also by many others with significant financial interests in the current
system.109 The Board has recent, unpleasant experience with politically
unpopular decisions.110 Obviously, the Board could craft such an excep-
tion broadly to exempt virtually all college athletes at all universities. Or
it could craft an exception to apply more narrowly to Colter’s claim. If
the latter, then CAPA and college athletes at other universities could pull
another arrow from the quiver and try again under the NLRA.
For those unfamiliar with the NLRA, it is worth noting that doctrin-
107. See N.Y. Univ., 356 N.L.R.B. at 1 (“Petitioner . . . offered to present evidence of
collective-bargaining experience in higher education as well as expert testimony demonstrating
that, even giving weight to the considerations relied on by the Board in Brown University, the
graduate students are appropriately classified as employees under the Act.”).
108. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (excluding ‘managerial’
employees from bargaining units); NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454
U.S. 170, 190 (1981) (excluding confidential employees from bargaining units). In its invitation to
interested parties to file briefs, the Board signaled that it might consider treating college athletes
as it treats confidential employees. Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359 (May 12,
2014) (Invitation to File Briefs) (“[S]hould the Board recognize [college athletes] as ‘employees’
under the Act, but [treat them as it treats] confidential employees under Board law?”).
109. Prominent examples are cable and over-the-air television networks and coaches’
organizations. All have significant financial stakes in the status quo. See Andy Staples, How
Television Changed College Football—and How It Will Again, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 6,
2012), http://www.si.com/college-football/2012/08/06/tv-college-football (“ESPN will pay a
reported $80 million to broadcast the Rose Bowl on Jan. 1, 2015.”).
110. See Steven Greenhouse, In Boeing Case, House Passes Bill Restricting Labor Board,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/business/
house-approves-bill-restricting-nlrb.html (House passes a bill to restrict National Labor Relations
Board jurisdiction after the Board’s acting general counsel filed an unfair labor practice complaint
challenging the legality of a proposed move of a Boeing production plant from Washington to
South Carolina).
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al changes based on Board sensitivity to the legal and political environ-
ment are a feature of the system, not a bug. There are many well-known
examples of the Board changing labor policy when a new President’s
appointees took their seats on the Board.111 Indeed, on this issue, not
only did Brown reverse the New York University decision, but New York
University itself reversed earlier decisions which had held that graduate
students were not employees under the NLRA.112 Several aspects of the
structure and evolution of the NLRA indicate that the Board is designed
to occupy a middle ground between judicial insulation from political
influence and legislative responsiveness to it.113 Doctrinal shifts like
these are a feature of that middle ground.
Thus, the ultimate outcome of the appeal to the Board is uncertain.
But for now, assume that Colter succeeds in convincing the Board that
he and his teammates are employees under the NLRA. (Again, the
Regional Director’s decision in Northwestern was faithful to current
Board doctrine; a finding of employee status is the likely outcome under
current doctrine.114) One curious aspect of Colter’s decision to pull the
unionization arrow from his quiver is that even if he succeeds on the
employee issue, he will not have won much unless he can also win on
several other issues. This is in contrast to other possible routes Colter
might have taken where a win on the employee issue would have trans-
lated more directly into a positive ultimate result.115 A possible explana-
tion for Colter’s choice is that if he can overcome all the hurdles,
unionization gives him what he says he wants most: a seat at the table.116
Determining the appropriate bargaining unit is one of the additional
hurdles. The bargaining unit defines both who would get to vote in a
union election and who the union would represent if it were selected.117
111. The Board’s shifting rules on factual misrepresentations during union election campaigns
is the most famous example. See Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 129–130 (1982)
(discussing the Board’s various practices in the past regarding the determination of the “truth or
falsity of campaign propaganda”).
112. For a review of that history, see Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 486–87 (2004).
113. For good discussions, see Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The
Transformation of the NLRB, 1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1363–66 (2000); Daniel P.
O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and Methods of Statutory
Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 235 (2008).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. R
115. See infra Part V.A.
116. Northwestern QB Colter Starts Movement to Form College Players’ Union, GAZETTE
(Jan. 28, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://thegazette.com/2014/01/28/northwestern-qb-colter-starts-
movement-to-form-college-players-union/ (quoting Colter as saying, “A lot of people will think
this is all about money; it’s not. . . . We’re asking for a seat at the table to get our voice heard.”).
The union supporting Colter, CAPA, forwards more traditional, primarily economic goals, such as
better health insurance coverage and increased compensation. See What We’re Doing, COLL.
ATHLETES PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.collegeathletespa.org/what (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
117. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA104.txt unknown Seq: 18  4-DEC-14 9:07
82 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:65
Colter’s petition to the National Labor Relations Board identified the
unit as “all football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships from
Northwestern University.”118 The Regional Director found that to be an
appropriate unit.119 Colter estimated that there were about eighty-five
players in that unit,120 and he certified, as required to have his petition
considered, that at least thirty percent of those players had signed cards
supporting the petition.121 If the Board were to find that Colter and his
teammates were employees, it would still have to determine if scholar-
ship football players constituted the appropriate bargaining unit.122
The appropriate bargaining unit is also a contested issue in the
Northwestern case. A bargaining unit is not “appropriate” if it excludes
employees who share an “overwhelming community of interest” with
employees in the unit.123 Northwestern claimed that walk-ons shared
that “overwhelming community of interest,” so Colter’s proposed unit
was inappropriate.124 The Regional Director rejected this both because
walk-ons were not employees at all, which made the possibility of a
fractured unit of employees impossible, and because they did not share
an “overwhelming community of interest” since they were not paid.125
The Board will review this determination.
However, the possibility of including walk-ons in the unit is only
one of many possible complications in specifying the appropriate bar-
118. Northwestern Univ. Petition, supra note 2. The petition specifies that the unit shall not
include “guards.” Id. This may have been a bit of lawyer humor. “Guards” are treated specially
under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). Guards are defined as individuals employed to protect an
employer’s property or safety; while they can join and form unions, their unions must be separate
from unions for other employees. Id. Guards under the NLRA are a distinct species from guards in
football, who are tasked with various non-ball handling roles as part of the offensive line.
119. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 21–22. The Regional Director excluded
from the unit players who had exhausted their playing eligibility. Id. at 23. Ironically, this means
that Kain Colter himself was not able to vote in the election.
120. Northwestern Univ. Petition, supra note 2. Seventy-six Northwestern football players
were determined to be eligible to vote on the election that was held on April 25, 2014. Alejandra
Cancino & Teddy Greenstein, Northwestern Football Players Cast Ballots in Union Vote, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-25/business/chi-northwestern...-
ohr-college-athletes-players-association-northwestern-football-players.
121. NLRB RULES, supra note 29, § 101.18. The cards could have said that the players wanted R
the union to represent them or they could have said merely that the players wanted an election to
determine if the union had majority support. Thirty percent of either type of card is required to
support an election petition. Id.
122. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2012) (“The Board shall decide in
each case whether . . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . . . .”).
123. Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 1 (Aug. 26, 2011),
enforced sub nom. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC v. NLRB, 727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013); see
also Odwalla, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 5 (Dec. 9, 2011).
124. Northwestern Univ. Decision, supra note 5, at 21.
125. Id. at 21–22.
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gaining unit, and one of the least controversial because they are probably
not employees at all. For example, why limit the bargaining unit to foot-
ball players? Under Colter’s argument, every scholarship athlete at
Northwestern is potentially an employee. Why not include men’s basket-
ball players, too, who operate in a very similar, high-profile environment
to Colter and his teammates?126 Why not include all scholarship athletes
at Northwestern since all are subject to similar levels of control, time
commitment, etc.? Northwestern sponsors nineteen men’s and women’s
sports.127 In theory, the bargaining unit could include any one or any
combination of these teams. Thus, within the athletic program alone,
there are about 185,000 different possible bargaining unit configura-
tions.128 And who is to say that the athletes should be in a separate unit
from others who are similarly situated at the University, such as teaching
assistants, if the Board returns to the analysis of New York University?
Or others?
The Board is empowered to make bargaining unit determina-
tions,129 but it does so with exceedingly mushy standards. The overall
standard is that the Board groups together employees who share a “com-
munity of interest” considering factors such as similarity in the kinds of
work performed, in qualifications and skills required, in hours worked,
and in wage and benefit levels.130 The Board is required only to deter-
126. Alicia Jessop, College Basketball Revenue and Game Attendance,  BUS. COLL. SPORTS
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://businessofcollegesports.com/2012/03/05/college-basketball-revenue-and-
game-attendance/ (“While the majority of the most profitable programs were football programs,
some were surprised to learn that 41 of the top-100 most profitable programs were basketball
programs.”).
127. NORTHWESTERN WILDCATS, http://www.nusports.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
128. My good friend and statistical expert, Ramona Paetzold, tells me that the number of
possible combinations of nineteen separate items where order does not matter is 184,757. As a
practical matter, of course, the number of reasonable and likely bargaining units is much fewer
than this. But combinatorials are fun.
129. The Board has delegated this authority to its regional directors, so the presumption is that
the initial determinations will be made by them. Regional directors, however, may redirect cases
back to the Board when they involve “novel or complex” issues. NLRB RULES, supra note 29, R
§ 101.20. The decisions are based on a record developed before a hearing officer who considers
and summarizes evidence submitted by the parties, but makes no recommendation. Id.
§§ 101.20–101.21. An interesting aspect of this procedure is that the parties cannot normally
obtain judicial review of bargaining-unit determinations (or other issues in representation
proceedings) until after an election has been held. Am. Fed’n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401,
404, 411–12 (1940) (the NLRA provides for judicial review only of “final orders”; decisions of
the Board in representation proceedings are not “final orders”). Judicial review is delayed “to
prevent obstructive recourse to the courts at various stages of the representation proceeding and
long delay in the determination of employee preferences on the matter of unionization.”
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 76 (15th ed. 2011). Even when
judicial review of bargaining-unit determinations is obtained later, the courts tend to defer greatly
to the Board’s expertise. Id. at 267.
130. For a good discussion, see Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. NLRB, 529 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
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mine “an” appropriate unit and is not charged with selecting the best or
most optimal one.131 Thus, in most cases before the Board, the bargain-
ing unit determination is not contentious because the parties agree or the
precedents are clear.
Easy resolution of the bargaining unit issue is not likely to be the
case for Colter for two reasons. First, there is little precedent and no
custom to guide the Board in this area. When Congress extended the
Board’s jurisdiction to non-profit hospitals in 1974, the result was an
extended period of uncertainty and vacillation about appropriate bar-
gaining units in hospitals, which eventually resulted in a rare instance of
Board rulemaking.132 The situation with college athletes is similar; the
novelty of the setting, lack of guidance, and plethora of possible bar-
gaining units all make it unlikely that the issue could be decided quickly
and easily. Second, the answer on this issue need not be the same at all
universities. It could be that a bargaining unit of all scholarship athletes
would be appropriate at one university, while separate units for each
sport would be appropriate at another university.133 Many arrows.
Quick and easy resolution of the bargaining unit issue is also
unlikely because the stakes are high. As mentioned above, if Colter can-
not demonstrate support from at least thirty percent of the bargaining
unit, his election petition will be dismissed.134 In his election petition,
Colter certified that he had support from thirty percent of Northwest-
ern’s football players.135 But, if the appropriate unit is all Northwestern
athletes, then he may not be able to demonstrate that support and his
petition would be dismissed. His attempt at unionization would be over.
Similarly, even if he can demonstrate thirty percent support with a
broader unit, he may have difficulty winning an election.136 After all,
131. See id. (citing Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 86 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
132. For a brief description, see COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 244–48. R
133. A couple of points on this. First, some have indicated that bargaining units might extend
across different universities or even extend across the entire NCAA. See Parasuraman, supra note
82, at 747–49. This will not occur. Multiemployer units occur only if all parties agree and only R
after individual employer units have already been properly formed. Steven L. Willborn, A New
Look at NLRB Policy on Multiemployer Bargaining, 60 N.C. L. REV. 455, 457 (1982) (I’ve been
waiting for thirty years to cite this article). At the initial organizing stage, multiemployer units are
simply not possible. Id. Second, others have argued that unionization may provide antitrust
protection for the NCAA under the labor antitrust exemption enjoyed by professional sports
teams. See Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to
Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1075 (2012). This will also not
occur. The NCAA would enjoy the labor exemption only if all member institutions were a part of
the same multiemployer unit, and that is not possible. Among many other reasons, private and
public institutions in the NCAA are governed by different labor regimes.
134. NLRB RULES, supra note 29, § 101.18. R
135. Northwestern Univ. Petition, supra note 2.
136. Even within the football team, the vote would not be unanimous. Some football players
testified against unionization at the Colter hearing. Kevin Trahan, At Final Hearing, Former
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA104.txt unknown Seq: 21  4-DEC-14 9:07
2014] COLLEGE ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES 85
most college athletes are not Kain Colter and football players; college
athletes in other sports may prefer the current system to one that
increases the power and influence of well-known athletes in high-profile
sports. Union election campaigns can be contentious; unions often lose
them.137
So the ultimate outcome of Colter’s election petition with the
National Labor Relations Board is highly uncertain and, at the end of the
day, may not be very definitive, even within the relatively narrow
domain governed by the NLRA. The current status of the case is that the
full National Labor Relations Board has agreed to review the Regional
Director’s decision that Colter is an employee within an appropriate bar-
gaining unit.138 On April 25, 2014, the Board conducted an election in
the unit found appropriate by the Regional Director, but it impounded
the results pending the Board’s review.139 At this point, there are three
possible end points for the case.140 First, the Board could reverse the
Regional Director’s decision. The impounded ballots would then be
destroyed and the case terminated. Because of the limits on judicial
review in election proceedings, there would be no judicial review of the
Northwestern Players Back School, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://www.usa
today.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/02/25/college-football-northwestern-wildcats-capa-labor-
union-hearing/5816639/. An interesting side issue in the case could be whether Northwestern or
its coaches played any role in soliciting this statement. If so, they may have engaged in conduct
that violated the NLRA. See A.O. Smith Auto. Prods. Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 994, 994 (1994) (holding
that it is improper for an employer to pressure employees to make an observable choice or open
acknowledgement of union sentiments). For the classic discussion of the issue, see Derek C. Bok,
The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 107–112 (1964).
137. In fiscal year 2013, 1,986 election petitions like Colter’s were filed with the National
Labor Relations Board, 1,330 elections were held, and unions won 852 of those elections.
Representation Petitions—RC, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach
/graphs-data/petitions-and-elections/representation-petitions-rc (last visited Sept. 19, 2014). Thus,
unions prevailed on 43% of all petitions filed and in 64% of elections held.
138. Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359 (Apr. 24, 2014) (order granting
Northwestern’s request for review of the decision).
139. Cancino & Greenstein, supra note 120. R
140. There are also many possible way stations. For example, in opposing the unionization
effort, Northwestern University has done things that could give rise to unfair labor practice
charges, such as providing players with new iPads the day after the Regional Director’s initial
decision and conducting one-on-one meetings between players and coaches. Ben Strauss, At
Northwestern, a Blitz to Defeat an Effort to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com/2014/04/24/sports/ncaafootball/at-northwestern-a-blitz-to-defeat-an-effort-to-unionize
.html. See NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (conferring benefits on employees
with intent to influence union vote is improper); Blue Flash Express, 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 594
(1954) (individual interrogation of employees is unlawful if coercive in light of time, place,
information sought, and employer’s conceded preference). See also Trahan, supra note 136 (some R
Northwestern University football players testified against the union, saying they were grateful for
what the university had provided them).
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Board’s decision.141 Second, the Board could uphold the Regional
Director’s decision and then open the ballots, but find that Colter had
lost the election. Again, that would end the case with no judicial
review.142 Finally, the Board could uphold the Regional Director’s deci-
sion, open the ballots, and find that Colter had won the election. In that
case, the Board would certify CAPA as the union representative of
Northwestern football players, but Northwestern University would then
likely refuse to bargain with the union. In that circumstance, CAPA
would file a refusal-to-bargain unfair labor practice charge with the
Board,143 which would begin a process that would result in judicial
review of the Board’s decision.144 In sum, the ultimate outcome in Col-
ter’s case is still quite uncertain, and some of the possible outcomes will
not result in a definitive resolution of the issues raised by Colter.
A principal point so far—and the principal point of this article—is
that Colter’s case represents only one arrow in an overflowing quiver.
Colter may fail for a variety of reasons—because the Board rules that he
is not an employee, because the bargaining unit turns out to be inappro-
priate, because he loses the election—but those outcomes will not deter-
mine the outcome for all college athletes everywhere.145 Similarly, he
may win and have that outcome affirmed in the courts, but again there
are many varieties of college athletes and not all will fall into the rela-
tively narrow category presented by Colter and Northwestern Univer-
sity. In sum, there are many arrows even in the small pocket of the
quiver that covers collective rights of college athletes at private
universities.
Finally, an interesting aspect of this particular arrow is that, even if
Colter survives this entire gauntlet and prevails, his victory would not
necessarily require a complete rethinking of the structure of college ath-
letics.146 After all, what Colter would win would be an opportunity to
141. See supra note 129. R
142. Id.
143. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2012).
144. SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2835
(John E. Higgins, Jr., ed., 5th ed. 2006) (“[A]n employer desiring to contest a certification must
refuse to bargain and then assert its position by way of defense in an unfair labor practice
proceeding and subsequently on judicial review.”). The judicial review could include
consideration both of the Board’s decision about employee status and its bargaining unit
determination.
145. As discussed above, it is possible that the Board could carve out a broad, new non-
statutory exemption for college athletes. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Even then, R
however, it is unlikely the exclusion would cover all college athletes everywhere, say at the
smallest liberal arts colleges, or community colleges, or junior colleges. But resolution of Colter’s
claim in that way would result in a relatively broad impact.
146. On the other hand, some things would need to be rethought immediately. Northwestern,
for example, like many universities, has established a Student-Athlete Advisory Committee to
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talk about certain things with the university.147 A victory would not
mean that Colter is entitled to more compensation, better benefits, less
practice time, or anything else. Thus, in theory, it would be possible that
nothing Colter would request—or be able to get148—would violate any
current NCAA rules governing college athletics. This is not the case
with some of the other arrows in the quiver, which I will discuss later.
IV. COLLEGE ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES
UNDER STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAWS
Northwestern University is a private employer. As a result, Kain
Colter’s request for unionization fell under the jurisdiction of the NLRA,
as would the claims of almost all college athletes at private universi-
ties.149 Even though there are many reasons for thinking that the results
under the NLRA would be diverse even within that universe, the situa-
tions are at least governed by the same basic set of organizing principles.
That is not the case with college athletes at public institutions. Those
institutions are governed by state public-sector collective bargaining
laws that vary enormously.150 As a result, the possibility of divergent
results—and, hence, the possibility that college athletes will be recog-
“promote[ ] communication between the athletic administration and student-athletes at
Northwestern.” Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. ATHLETIC DEP’T,
http://www.northwestern.edu/academicservices/cats-lifeskills/saac/index.html (last visited Sept.
19, 2014). If Northwestern’s college athletes are employees governed by the NLRA, this type of
employer-established consultation group would probably be a violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(2) of the NLRA. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d
1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
147. The “certain” things are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA. Generally,
mandatory subjects are “wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(d), 159(a); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
There is a deep and complex body of law articulating what must be bargained about. See generally
SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1246–1399
(John E. Higgins, Jr., ed., 5th ed. 2006). In this context, in broad terms, Northwestern would have
to talk about things like at scholarship levels and practice times, but would not have to bargain
about things like media contracts and stadium expansion plans.
148. Again, all Colter would win would be the right to discuss mandatory subjects of
bargaining with Northwestern University. Northwestern would not have to agree to any of
Colter’s requests. For an early statement of this basic principle of labor law, see NLRB v. Ins.
Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960) (“Congress intended that the parties should have
wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate the
substantive solution of their differences.”).
149. The NLRA may not apply to college athletes at a few private universities, such as those at
some religious schools. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 504–07 (1979)
(excluding lay teachers at Catholic high schools from the jurisdiction of the NLRA on First
Amendment grounds).
150. Fram and Frampton have carefully documented this in the context of college athletics. See
Fram & Frampton, supra note 133, at 1038–68 (“provid[ing] the first detailed survey of state laws R
regarding the collective bargaining rights of students at public universities”). Kearney and
Mareschal have also done so, but with a broader frame. RICHARD C. KEARNEY & PATRICE M.
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nized as employees somewhere, sometime—is much greater under state
public-sector collective bargaining laws than under the NLRA.
Nicholas Fram and T. Ward Frampton have done a wonderful
recent survey of the states on this issue, and I will not repeat it here.151
However, I do want to call on their research to support the principal
thesis of this article—that there are so many arrows in the quivers of
college athletes that a persistent effort to attain employee status is likely
to succeed.
The universe of athletes who could raise the issue of union repre-
sentation under public-sector bargaining laws is large. Fifty-four of the
sixty-two universities in the top five conferences are public institu-
tions;152 therefore, most are governed by public-sector bargaining
laws.153 As a result, at the major schools for athletics, there are many
more college athletes who might be able to raise unionization issues
under state-level public-bargaining laws than there are Kain Colters who
can raise the issues under the NLRA.
The rules for determining employee status vary greatly across the
state bargaining laws.154 The rules in some states would be quite
favorable to representation claims by college athletes; in others, the rules
would prohibit such efforts or be quite unfavorable; and in still other
states, it is largely unexplored territory.155 There is also variance in how
the rules within a state might apply to college athletes at different insti-
tutions within that state or even to different teams or different athletes
within a particular institution.
First, in some states, this issue is exceedingly easy. Some states do
not permit bargaining by any public employees,156 and some permit bar-
gaining only for narrow classes of public employees, which do not
MARESCHAL, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 64–85 (5th ed. 2014). Their conclusions
are largely consistent, but their counts of states vary some.
151. See Fram & Frampton, supra note 133, at 1038–68. R
152. 11 College Football Conferences and Their 120 Teams, PROCON.ORG, http://
collegefootball.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=003290 (last updated Sept. 11, 2012).
153. For this count, the top five athletic conferences are the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Big
Ten Conference, the Big Twelve Conference, the Pacific Twelve Conference, and the
Southeastern Conference. My count was done in February 2014. Given the pace of conference
realignments, the counts may change by the time this article is published. But the general
allocation between public and private universities will be about the same. See Northwestern Univ.
Decision, supra note 5, at 3 n.2 (noting that 17 of the 120 to 125 universities sponsoring football
teams at the highest level within the NCAA are private institutions).
154. See supra note 150. R
155. Id.
156. Fram and Frampton count thirteen of these states. Fram & Frampton, supra note 133, at R
1068. Kearney and Mareschal count eight of them. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 150, at R
67–68.
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include college athletes.157 Arrows for this purpose are not lying around
in any of these states.
On the other hand, although no state has yet held that college ath-
letes can organize under these laws (in large part, because Colter-like
petitions have not been filed), the chances for successful recognition
seem quite good in some states. As under the NLRA, the closest analogy
is to graduate assistants.
In Florida, for example, college athletes could call on the state con-
stitution to support their right to organize. In 1979, the Florida Public
Employee Relations Commission (“PERC”) permitted graduate assis-
tants at two public schools to unionize.158 In response, in 1981, the legis-
lature amended the public bargaining statute to exclude graduate stu-
dents from its definition of “public employee.”159 In United Faculty of
Florida v. Board of Regents,160 the Florida First District Court of Appeal
held that the exclusion violated a provision of the Florida Constitution,
which provides that the rights of employees “to bargain collectively
shall not be denied or abridged.”161
The United Faculty decision is highly favorable to college athletes
attempting to unionize at public universities in Florida for several rea-
sons. First, the court rejected the Board’s claim that graduate assistants
“were more student than employee” for reasons that would generally
support the claims of college athletes.162 Those reasons generally track
those I have previously discussed.163 The court concluded that “a person
157. Fram & Frampton identify this category but do not specify how many states fit within it.
Fram & Frampton, supra note 133, at 1068. Kearney & Mareschal count ten states in this R
category. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 150, at 65–66 tbl. 3.2 (listing states that permit R
bargaining for public employees other than state employees).
158. See Bd. of Regents v. Pub. Emps. Relations Comm’n, 368 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (affirming PERC order “finding that graduate assistants are both students and public
employees”).
159. See Fram & Frampton, supra note 133, at 1048 (“In response to the PERC decision, the R
Florida Legislature hastily amended the definition of ‘public employee’ to exclude students.”).
Before 1981, the statute excluded from the definition of “public employee”:
Those persons enrolled as graduate students in the State University System
employed as graduate assistants, graduate teaching assistants, graduate teaching
associates, graduate research assistants, or graduate research associates and those
persons enrolled as undergraduate students in the State University system who
perform part time work for the State University System.
See Act effective July 6, 1981, ch. 81-305, 1981 Fla. Laws 1456, amended by Act effective Jan. 7,
2003, ch. 387, § 1006, 2002 Fla. Laws 4130. The 2003 amendment to this statute deleted the
above quoted portion excluding graduate students so that it complied with the Florida First
District Court of Appeal’s decision, United Faculty of Fla. v. Bd. of Regents, 417 So. 2d 1055,
clarified by 423 So. 2d 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
160. 417 So. 2d at 1055.
161. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
162. United Faculty of Fla., 417 So. 2d at 1058.
163. The reasons the court gave that would support the claims of college athletes were that
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who works as an employee remains an employee even if his principal
focus is on obtaining an education rather than on earning a full
living.”164
Second, the court noted and rejected the National Labor Relations
Board’s position at that time that graduate students were not employees
under the NLRA.165 The court said that collective rights under the
NLRA were not based on a constitutional guarantee.166 Thus, unlike the
National Labor Relations Board, the court said that it could not deny
employee status “on the basis of policy.”167 Third, and perhaps most
significantly, the court said that the State could deny bargaining status to
graduate students only if it could “demonstrate a compelling interest jus-
tifying that abridgment.”168 Finally, the court rejected the Board’s
claims that compelling reasons existed to deny bargaining status to grad-
uate students.169 The Board argued that denying bargaining status was
justified because the graduate students were already receiving a subsidy
(education at a state university) and because there was a danger that
costs would go up if bargaining were allowed.170 The court held that
neither of those reasons was compelling while emphasizing that granting
bargaining rights did not determine any actual practices;171 it would
merely require the Board to bargain.172
The same court later made clear that its opinion applied only to
graduate students.173 The statutory provision at issue in the case also
graduate students work under the direction of a faculty member; that the work could be unrelated
to the student’s academic area; that the work did not usually fulfill any degree-related
requirements; that the students did not receive academic credit for the work; and that the primary
beneficiaries of the work were the faculty and university. Id. at 1058–59. College athletes would
be on firmer ground than graduate students in that they are generally not supervised by faculty, so
the disconnect between work and study is greater. On the other hand, the court noted that the
graduate students worked “for regular pay,” which would not be the case for college athletes. Id.
at 1058.




168. Id. Proving compelling interests, of course, is exceedingly difficult. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (indicating that a state may need to be
able “to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy” to show that a compelling
interest exists).
169. United Faculty of Fla., 417 So. 2d at 1059.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1060. Although United Faculty is only a Florida Court of Appeal decision, the
Florida Supreme Court later cited the case approvingly in holding that an attempt to preclude
bargaining by attorneys employed by the State was unconstitutional. Chiles v. State Emps.
Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1999).
173. United Faculty of Fla. v. Bd. of Regents, 423 So. 2d 429, 430–31, clarifying 417 So. 2d
1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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excluded from the definition of public employee “persons enrolled as
under-graduate students in the State University System who perform[ed]
part-time work for the State University System.”174 The court made
clear that its decision applied only to graduate students and did not affect
the part of the statute excluding part-time undergraduate students from
coverage.175
This twist would weaken a claim by college athletes at public uni-
versities in Florida that they should have bargaining rights. Most college
athletes, after all, are undergraduate students. But college athletes should
be able to sidestep this obstacle. First, the statutory provision excluding
part-time undergraduate students may be unconstitutional. The United
Faculty decision did not consider that issue.176 The court’s clarification
did not rule that the exclusion for part-time undergraduate students was
constitutional; it merely limited the court’s order to the parties in the
case.177 But the court’s reasoning would certainly place the exclusion at
high risk of unconstitutionality. Part-time undergraduate cafeteria work-
ers would seem to be on stronger ground than the graduate students con-
sidered in United Faculty. Second, college athletes may not fit within
the exclusion. Kain Colter’s testimony was that college football was
much more than a part-time enterprise for him.178 But that may not be
the case for all college athletes in Florida. Thus, some college athletes
might fall within the exclusion; others may not. Third, not all college
athletes are undergraduates. So there is a class of college athletes who
would clearly not fall within the exclusion as written and, hence, would
have a constitutional right to organize in Florida.
In sum, college athletes at public universities in Florida have strong
claims of a constitutional right to organize. Those who are graduate stu-
dents fall directly under United Faculty.179 A much larger group of col-
lege athletes who can demonstrate that they are not part-time would also
have a right to organize under the statutory language.180 Even part-time
athletes would have a strong claim based on the rationale of United
174. Id. at 431. The Legislature later amended the statute to comply with this order. See supra
note 159. R
175. Id. at 430–31 (“Section 447.203(3)(1), Florida Statutes (1981) . . . shall now provide . . .
‘public employee’ means any person employed by a public employer except . . . persons enrolled
as undergraduate students . . . who perform part-time work for the State University System.”).
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See Alejandra Cancino & Teddy Greenstein, “It Truly is a Job,” College Quarterback
Tells Labor Board, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-18/
business/ct-northwestern-nlrb-hearing-0219-biz-20140219_1_northwestern-football-players-
labor-board-football-practice (“‘It truly is a job,’ Colter said. ‘There is no way around it.’ Colter
spoke of 50- to 60-hour workweeks for players.”).
179. See United Faculty of Fla., 423 So. 2d. at 430–31.
180. See id.
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Faculty.181
Constitutional protection, like that in Florida, may not be available
in other states. But in some states, college athletes will have strong
claims that the state’s public-sector bargaining law covers them. In Cali-
fornia, for example, the public-sector collective bargaining law has spe-
cific language to guide the Public Employment Relations Board
(“PERB”) in deciding whether student workers are employees who can
unionize under the law:
[S]tudent employees whose employment is contingent on their status
as students are employees only if the services they provide are unre-
lated to their educational objectives, or that those educational objec-
tives are subordinate to the services they perform and that coverage
under this [law] would further the purposes of this [law].182
PERB has interpreted this to require an intricate three-part test.183
The key to the analysis for college athletes will be in the third part of the
test: Are the educational objectives furthered by their participation in
college athletics “subordinate” to the service provided.184 In two leading
decisions, PERB applied this balancing test to teaching assistants and
held that educational objectives were subordinate to the service pro-
vided.185 PERB said that being a teaching assistant was not vital to
achieving educational objectives.186 Teaching did not meet any aca-
demic requirement, it often involved little interaction with faculty mem-
bers, and students who were not teaching assistants were able to achieve
their educational outcomes anyway.187 On the other hand, PERB noted
that the teaching assistants were vital to the university’s ability to pro-
vide instruction.188 The university would have great difficulty in provid-
ing instruction without this large pool of academically-qualified people
willing to work at “relatively modest” wages.189 And the universities
would have to provide that instruction (and those services) even if stu-
dents did not perform them.190
181. See id.
182. Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 3562(e)
(West 2010) [hereinafter HEERA].
183. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 22 P.E.R.C. ¶ 29084, 6 (1998); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 23 P.E.R.C. ¶ 30025, 1998 WL 35395605, at *3 (1998). For a discussion of the PERB ruling,
see Fram & Frampton, supra note 133, at 1041–45. R
184. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 22 P.E.R.C at 6.
185. Id. at 7; Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 1998 WL 35395605, at *11.
186. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 22 P.E.R.C at 24–25 (“Employment as an associate meets
several education objectives . . . .” However, the small number of associate positions indicates that
being a teaching associate is not vital to achieving one’s educational objectives.).
187. See id.
188. Id. at 22.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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College athletes would be on stronger ground than teaching assis-
tants on both parts of this balancing. Most of the grounds cited by PERB
for a weak connection between services and educational objectives for
teaching assistants are also true for college athletes: the services them-
selves do not meet academic requirements; there is little interaction
between faculty and college athletes on athletic matters; and others are
able to achieve the same educational objectives without participating in
college athletics. But the connection was stronger for teaching assistants
who at least were working within their academic fields.
The other part of the balance weighs how important the services are
to the university.191 PERB found that the services of teaching assistants
were “vital” to the university even while recognizing that non-students
could be hired to teach.192 Without the services of college athletes, on
the other hand, the university simply could not participate in intercolle-
giate athletics. Unless a university would want to argue that college ath-
letics is not important to the university’s objectives,193 its need for the
services of college athletes is very high. Thus, the connection between
services and educational objectives is weaker for college athletes than
for teaching assistants, and the university’s need for college athlete ser-
vices is greater than its need for teaching assistants. Overall, if educa-
tional objectives are subordinate to service for teaching assistants, then
that should be the case a fortiori for college athletes.194
These examples from Florida and California illustrate that college
athletes at public universities will have strong claims for organizational
rights under some public-sector bargaining laws. But they also illustrate
that the analysis in each state is likely to be highly particular to that
state. The Florida Constitution is the only one with its particular lan-
guage protecting bargaining rights.195 The California decisions—and the
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Universities would be loath to do this for many reasons. For example, it would conflict
with the basic purpose of the NCAA. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 62, art. 1.3.1. (“The R
competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a vital part of the
educational system.”). Maybe even more importantly, it may jeopardize their tax-exempt status.
See Richard Schmalbeck, Amateur Athletics: Two Strikes Against the Sweetheart Deal Between
Big-Time College Sports and the Tax System 3–26 (Oct. 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www1.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/resources/documents/REVISEDSchmalbeck-FinalCon
ferencepaper.pdf (discussing whether revenue produced by college sports is incidental to, or
unrelated to, the tax exempt purpose of universities, and the tax implications therein).
194. See Fram & Frampton, supra note 133, at 1045 (“If academic student employees (tutors, R
graduate student instructors, etc.) prevail in [this] balancing, it is difficult to see how college
athletes would not.”).
195. A Westlaw search of the state constitution database (ST-CONST) yielded only Florida as
a match for its constitutional language protecting bargaining rights. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6
(“rights of employees . . . to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged”).
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complex analyses they require—are based on statutory language that is
unique to California.196 As mentioned, some states deny bargaining
rights to all public employees, while in many others there is little guid-
ance on the issue.197 Thus, consistent with the theme of this article, the
decision in any particular state on whether college athletes at public
institutions can bargain with the university is likely to have limited
influence elsewhere. There are lots of arrows, and they come in many
different lengths and colors.
If college athletes were determined to be covered by a particular
state’s public-sector bargaining laws, then the subsequent analysis
would be very similar to the issues that would arise if Kain Colter is
successful. The state bargaining board would have to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit,198 the players would have to win an elec-
tion,199 and even then bargaining would be permitted only on a limited
set of subjects.200 As in Colter’s situation, the range of possible out-
comes on these issues is broad; obviously, the range is even broader here
than for private universities since the underlying statutes are more
diverse.
But determining that college athletes are subject to these laws and
permitting them to bargain about certain issues does not necessarily
upend the current structure of college athletics. As under the NLRA, and
as emphasized by the Florida court in United Faculty,201 the right
granted under these state laws would be the opportunity to talk about a
limited range of topics. Some of the most sensitive topics would almost
certainly fall outside the range of what the university would be required
even to talk about, such as the financial arrangements with its confer-
ence and media outlets. And even within the mandatory topics, nothing
would necessarily require the university to accede to any demands that
196. A Westlaw search of the state statutes database (STAT-ALL) yield only California as a
match for its statutory language on student workers. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3562(e) (West 2013)
(“students are employees only if the services they provide are unrelated to their educational
objectives”).
197. Fram & Frampton put thirty-four states in this category because there are no precedents in
those states involving graduate or undergraduate students. Fram & Frampton, supra note 133, at R
1067.
198. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 150, at 76. R
199. Or be recognized voluntarily, but that seems unlikely in this context.
200. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 150, at 77 (“[M]ost comprehensive policies follow R
the NRLA in mandating a broad scope over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.”). Permitted bargaining subjects may be even more limited for public-sector
employees under state bargaining laws than for private-sector employees under the NLRA. SETH
D. HARRIS ET AL., MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 703–750 (2013).
201. United Faculty of Fla. v. Bd. of Regents, 417 So. 2d 1055, 1060, clarified by 423 So. 2d
429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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might place its membership in the NCAA in jeopardy.202
V. COLLEGE ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES
UNDER LAWS PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
College athletes might also seek to be classified as employees
under laws protecting individual rights. This section will outline some of
the many types of claims that might be made and discuss the basic ana-
lytical structure for thinking about the employee-status issue in this con-
text. But it is important to note that, for several reasons, these types of
claims—alleging violations of laws protecting individual employee
rights—pose the greatest challenge to the current structure of college
athletics. First, and maybe most importantly, under many of these laws,
if a college athlete is found to be a covered employee, compliance with
the law may be in direct conflict with one of the basic pillars of the
current NCAA structure. For example, coverage under a state wage pay-
ment law may require that the college athlete be paid in cash rather than
through a scholarship.203
Second, a very large number of state and federal statutes protect a
diverse array of individual employment rights, and they vary greatly in
their coverage rules. With a persistent attempt, the odds are high that
some college athlete will succeed in being classified as an employee
under some statute somewhere. There are many arrows in this particular
part of the quiver, exponentially more than in the parts relating to collec-
tive rights.
Third, in contrast to collective rights, under laws protecting individ-
ual rights, college athletes do not have to rely on claims about some set
of college athletes generally. For example, they would not have to
demonstrate, as Kain Colter must, that college football players at North-
western generally spend forty hours per week in season on football and,
thus, they should all be classified as employees. Instead, under these
laws, college athletes can pick out the best plaintiff (say a one-and-done
202. The public-sector process for resolving disputes may be more threatening to universities
than the one under the NLRA. Under the NLRA, as already noted, the law is clear that an
employer need never accede to a bargaining demand. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (2012). In the public sector, on the other hand, some states have binding interest
arbitration procedures to resolve disagreements that could impose requirements on universities
without their acquiescence. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 200, at 853–902. R
203. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.010 (West 2011) (“[W]ages shall be payable in
legal tender of the United States or checks on banks convertible into cash on demand . . . .”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.9(C) (2013) (defining wages to mean “legal tender of the United States or
checks or drafts on banks negotiable into cash on demand or upon acceptance at full value”). See
generally MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.13 (3d ed. 2005). While compliance
with wage payment laws would conflict directly with current NCAA rules, that would not be true
for all individual-rights statutes. See infra note 231. R
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college basketball player204 or a severely injured player205) and attempt
to prove that that one player—the one with the best set of facts—is an
employee. This both increases the possibility of success on each individ-
ual claim and makes it possible to mount many more challenges. If Kain
Colter’s claim fails, the claim of the entire Northwestern football team
fails. If Kain Colter failed in an attempt to get workers’ compensation
coverage for his injury,206 that individual rights claim would not neces-
sarily preclude a claim from a basketball player or even another football
player.
Fourth, in cases involving individual rights, the law will mean more
and general policy considerations will mean less.207 As noted above, the
National Labor Relations Board is structured to engage in developing
national labor policy and to be politically responsive. As such, it has a
history of creating non-statutory exceptions to employee coverage under
the NLRA.208 In contrast, courts deciding coverage under individual
employment rights statutes do not enjoy such flexibility. They are
neither policy-making nor politically-responsive entities and, as a result,
ought to be quite hesitant to carve out non-statutory exceptions. For
example, the Fair Labor Standards Act provides a generous definition of
“employee”209 and includes a large number of exceptions.210 It would be
204. A “one-and-done” college basketball player is one who plays in college for only one year
before entering the National Basketball Association draft. These players could present strong
cases for employee status because the link between them and academics is weaker and,
correspondingly, their ties to commercialism are stronger. See John Feinstein, One-and-Done
College Basketball Players Aren’t ‘Student Athletes’, JOHN FEINSTEIN SHOW (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:07
PM), http://feinstein.radio.cbssports.com/2013/10/16/john-feinstein-blog-one-and-done-college-
basketball-players-arent-student-athletes (noting that a major shoe company announced that it
would be willing to enter into a $180 million endorsement deal with a recent one-and-done
basketball player as soon as he completed his first year). See also Kevin Clark, NFL Draft:
College Football’s NFL Problem, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2014, 10:24 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304585004579415241023161788 (noting that college football
players are increasingly leaving college early to enter the NFL draft).
205. See generally Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000).
206. Chris Johnson, What Will Former Northwestern Quarterback Kain Colter’s Legacy Be?,
INSIDENU (Mar. 28, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://www.insidenu.com/2014/3/28/5908779/what-will-
former-northwestern-quarterback-kain-colters-legacy-be (Colter claims that he was not
reimbursed for expenses for a necessary medical examination).
207. I argue later that, even when they are relevant, the policy arguments against coverage by
employment laws are not as powerful as some claim. See infra Part VII.
208. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. In general, public-sector bargaining
agencies are more similar to the National Labor Relations Board on this dimension than they are
to courts.
209. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2006).
210. See id. § 213 (listing eleven employee categories exempted from both the minimum wage
and maximum hour requirements; twenty-two categories exempted from the maximum hour
requirements only; and five categories exempted from the child labor requirements).
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extremely odd for a court to carve out a non-statutory exception.211
In this same vein, it would be more difficult for the powerful forces
opposing employee status to use their political influence to resist and
counter adverse judicial decisions. For the NLRA and state public-sector
bargaining laws, it might be possible for those forces to influence the
tribunals themselves or to get bills enacted that would reverse adverse
decisions.212 But that would be more difficult for laws protecting indi-
vidual rights both because some exemptions would be quite difficult
politically (for example, an attempt to exclude college athletes from
laws prohibiting sexual or racial harassment) and, again, because there
are just so many laws and decisionmakers in this universe. With a per-
sistent effort by college athletes, it could essentially become a game of
whack-a-mole.
A. An Introduction to the Universe of Individual Employment Laws
that Might Apply to College Athletes
The universe of laws protecting individual employee rights that
might be used by college athletes to further their interests (and that may
disrupt the current system) is very large. Let’s begin by considering the
effect these laws might have on college athletes and universities, assum-
ing the athletes are employees and the laws apply. After that, I will
discuss whether the laws apply to college athletes. I will not attempt to
provide a complete listing of all the laws that might fit into this cate-
gory.213 But this partial listing will provide a sense of the many
possibilities.
211. A court might do so for constitutional reasons. Cf., e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.,
440 U.S. 490, 499 (1979) (excluding lay teachers at Catholic high schools from the jurisdiction of
the NLRA on First Amendment grounds). But no such reasons exist in this context.
212. The Colter/Northwestern controversy has sparked some interest in legislatures to change
the normal employment rules for college athletes. See, e.g., H.B. 483, 130th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2013–2014) (“[A] student attending a state university . . . is not an employee of the
state university based upon the student’s participation in an athletic program offered by the state
university.”). The professional sports leagues have had success in some state legislatures in
limiting their exposure to certain types of employment claims. See Tom Pelissero, NFLPA May
Block Playoff Expansion Due to Saints’ Workers Comp Issues, USA TODAY (May 19, 2014, 8:21
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/05/19/nflpa-playoff-expansion-saints-
workers-compensation/9288645 (reporting that Louisiana, California, and Arizona had recently
enacted statutes to limit workers’ compensation benefits for professional athletes). On the other
hand, the involvement of state and local legislatures is a two-edged sword. See Jon Solomon,
Boston Tries to be First City with ‘College Athlete Bill of Rights’, CBSSPORTS.COM (May 19,
2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24567279/boston-
tries-to-be-first-city-with-college-athlete-bill-of-rights (discussing local ordinance requiring
certain benefits to be provided to college athletes).
213. For example, I do not consider unemployment compensation laws, drug-testing laws, laws
regulating employee benefits, occupational safety and health laws, or laws requiring employee
leaves. There are many other laws that are not on even this expanded list.
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A college athlete might claim minimum wages and overtime premi-
ums under federal or state law. In his case, Kain Colter estimated that he
received benefits from Northwestern of about $75,000,214 and North-
western presented testimony about an array of benefits that make that
estimate seem conservative.215 If averaged out over a year, the total
amount would easily exceed the minimum wage.216 Even at universities
much less expensive than Northwestern, the total amount of benefits
provided would probably exceed the minimum wage.217 But that is not
how the wage-and-hour laws work. First, the wage-and-hour laws
require week-by-week accounting.218 As a result, when Northwestern
has preseason practices before the academic year begins, the athletes are
working long hours and getting few benefits. That would be a violation
of the wage-and-hour laws. Second, if Northwestern players worked
more than forty hours in any week, which the rules specifically permit
during preseason practices,219 then Colter would be entitled to a bonus
of one-half his regular rate for each overtime hour.220 Northwestern does
not make such a calculation or payment. Third, the wage-and-hour laws
generally disfavor in-kind and other forms of non-cash payments.221
Most of Northwestern’s payments are in those forms. If non-cash pay-
ments are excluded from the calculation, Northwestern may violate both
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of these laws. Finally, it is
quite unlikely that Northwestern complies with the recordkeeping
requirements of the wage-and-hour laws.222
214. Cancino & Greenstein, supra note 178. R
215. Jeremy Fowler, The New Pay-for-Play: CFB Union Could Get Slammed with Tax Bill,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Feb. 20, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/
jeremy-fowler/24449896/the-new-pay-for-play-cfb-union-could-get-slammed-with-tax-bill
(estimating the value of the strength and conditioning program alone at $9,300 per year).
216. The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(a)(1)(c) (2006). If athletes worked twenty hours per week year-round (which exceeds the
NCAA maximums), the minimum wage total would be $7,540. I will cite to the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act in this paragraph, but these same principles also apply under most state
wage-and-hour laws.
217. Obviously, this is because of the interaction of relatively low minimum wage rates and the
relatively high cost of attendance at colleges and universities. Because of this interaction, most
universities, like Northwestern, should not violate the minimum wage laws in gross terms. But
some states and localities have much higher minimum wages and some universities have low costs
of attendance, so it is possible that a few universities could brush up against a violation.
218. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.104 (2013) (“The Act takes a single workweek as its standard and
does not permit averaging of hours over 2 or more weeks.”); Marshall v. Sam Dell’s Dodge Corp.,
451 F. Supp. 294, 301–03 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (“Having established the week as the applicable pay
period, defendants cannot now argue that any other time period measures compl[y] with the act.”).
219. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 62, art. 17.1.6.3.5 (daily and weekly hour R
limitations do not apply to preseason practices).
220. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
221. 29 C.F.R. § 531.27 (2013) (“Payment in cash or its equivalent required.”).
222. 29 C.F.R. § 516 (2013).
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Second, a college athlete might challenge the form in which she is
paid under a state wage payment statute. Most states have wage payment
statutes that require wages to be paid in cash (rather than script or
employer credits, for example), on a regular basis, with only specified
deductions, etc.223 If college athletes were classified as employees under
these statutes, university practices would conflict with a number of these
requirements.
Third, a college athlete might seek damages from the university for
discrimination, such as racial or sexual harassment.224 For racial or sex-
ual harassment, the athlete could also seek recourse under Title VI225 or
Title IX226 and, hence, avoid the issue of whether she is an employee.
But the liability and damage rules are more favorable under state and
federal laws prohibiting this form of discrimination against employees,
so she may prefer those options.227 For other types of discrimination
(such as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation), state or local
employment law may provide the only protection available.228
Fourth, a college athlete might seek workers’ compensation bene-
fits for injuries suffered in a game or practice. If he is considered an
employee, the athlete would likely qualify for benefits under these state
laws, even without any showing of negligence. This issue could also
arise with the parties switching sides on the issue of whether the college
athlete is an employee. If a college athlete filed a tort action against a
university claiming that his injuries were the result of university negli-
gence (say in protecting him from concussions229), then the university
223. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. R
224. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(b) (2012) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of race or sex).
225. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (prohibiting race
or national origin discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance).
226. See Title IX of the Educational Amendment Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)
(prohibiting sex discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance).
227. Compare, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650–51 (1999) (to
prove sexual harassment under Title IX, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was
“deliberately indifferent” to harassment that is “severe, pervasive and objectively offensive”), with
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (to prove sexual harassment under Title VII, the plaintiff must
prove that the harassment was “severe or pervasive,” and then defendant is liable unless it can
demonstrate that it acted reasonably in preventing and correcting the harassment) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006) (discrimination
based on sexual orientation not prohibited by Title VII); see Employment Non-Discrimination
Laws, MOVEMENT ENHANCING PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/employment_non
_discrimination_laws (last updated Oct. 21, 2014).
229. See, e.g., Kelly A. Heard, Note, The Impact of Preemption in the NFL Concussion
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might defend by claiming that the athlete was an employee. If success-
ful, this would mean the university would be liable to the athlete for
workers’ compensation, but it could avoid the potentially higher tort
damages.230 This is an interesting twist on the many-arrows theme of
this article. While most universities will undoubtedly favor excluding
college athletes from workers’ compensation laws, it may be in the eco-
nomic interest of some universities in some circumstances to defect. It is
possible, then, that a university could shoot one of these arrows.231
Again, this is not a comprehensive listing of the possibilities. But
each of these presents an opportunity for a college athlete to raise the
issue of whether she should be treated as an employee. In total, there are
hundreds of independent opportunities to raise the issue of employee
status—under separate state laws in each area (and almost all states have
laws in all these areas), as well as under federal laws for wage-and-hour
or discrimination claims.232
Litigation, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 221, 245–47 (2013) (discussing proposed settlement agreement
between NFL and class of players with concussion injuries).
230. The basic trade-off of workers’ compensation systems is that employees get more certain
coverage in exchange for lower levels of compensation for injuries. The coverage is more certain
because employees do not have to prove negligence and employers cannot use tort defenses such
as assumption of the risk. In return, the level of compensation is intentionally set at a level that
leaves the worker worse off than he would have been had he never been injured. See Richard A.
Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ Compensation Law, 16 GA.
L. REV. 775, 800 (1982). Exclusivity is one doctrine that enforces this trade-off. If a worker is
covered by workers’ compensation, that is her exclusive remedy; she cannot sue in tort. See
WILLBORN, supra note 22, at 882–907. Thus, one classic type of workers’ compensation case is an
attempt by employers to fall within the workers’ compensation system to preclude a tort suit,
which could entail substantially higher damages. See Millison v. E.I. du Point de Nemours & Co.,
501 A.2d 505, 517 (N.J. 1985) (employer seeking to be covered by workers’ compensation to
avoid higher tort damages from asbestos exposure). In the context of college athletics, it might be
in a university’s interest to try to fit within workers’ compensation against a claim that it was
negligent in treating a severe sports injury or in protecting against concussions.
231. It may be possible for college athletes to be covered by state workers’ compensation laws
without violating NCAA rules. Those rules permit institutions to provide “medical and related
expenses and services to a student athlete.” NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 62, art. 16.4. R
In essence, workers’ compensation provides a form of health insurance without any deductibles or
copayments. Although not every aspect of workers’ compensation aligns perfectly with the NCAA
rules, article 16.4 indicates that this type of coverage is not in serious conflict with the goals and
principles of the NCAA. It may be possible for workers’ compensation and the NCAA regulatory
system to be accommodated.
232. Classification as “employees” may not always benefit college athletes, even those in high-
profile sports. Some have noted, for example, that if college athletes were classified as employees
by the Internal Revenue Service, they would have to begin paying taxes on the benefits they
receive. See Fowler, supra note 215. There are several points about this. First, in line with the R
main point of this article, classification as an employee under a particular employment law does
not automatically translate into classification as an employee under the Internal Revenue Code.
The Internal Revenue Service has its own twenty-factor test for making that determination. See
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. Second, even if the tax consequences meant that college
athletes would prefer not to be classified as employees, that would not matter legally. The
“employee” determination is made objectively. See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d
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B. College Athletes as Employees Under Employment Laws
Protecting Individual Rights
A foundational question for all these potential arrows is whether the
college athlete is an employee. Consistent with the main theme of this
paper, since there are many possible laws at issue, there are also many
potential answers to the foundational question. No uniform definition of
employee exists across all these statutes. States make different policy
choices about the applicability of their statutes; some statutes call for
broader or narrower coverage. Some of the statutes in these areas have
only the barest definition of who is an employee; some have long, highly
specific definitions. Again, all the possibilities will not be surveyed here.
But this section will give a flavor of the nature of the argument.
The starting point for determining who is an employee is the com-
mon-law test, sometimes known as the right-to-control test.233 Where a
statute is especially vague on the issue, the common-law test may be
controlling.234 Even where statutes provide more guidance, the common-
law test is often influential.235
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) has recently considered all the
case law and restated the common-law test.236 The parts that are relevant
to the issue of whether college athletes are employees read as follows:
§ 1.01 General Conditions for Existence of Employment Relationship
(1) Subject to § 1.02 . . . ,237 an individual renders services as
an employee of an employer if
(a) the individual acts, at least in part to serve the inter-
ests of the employer, [and]
(b) the employer consents to receive the individual’s ser-
vices . . . .238
1529, 1532, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that migrant workers were employees even though
some of them would have preferred not to be); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor,
471 U.S. 290, 293, 306 (1985) (holding that associates of a religious foundation are employees
even though the associates “vigorously protested the payment of wages, [and] assert[ed] that they
considered themselves volunteers”). Third, playing this tune backwards, the current non-coverage
of college athletes under the tax laws constitutes a substantial tax subsidy to college athletics.
233. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, supra note 73, ch. 1, intro. note cmt. a (“In addition [to R
delineating the rules for the common law], these rules help inform the interpretation of statutes
that limit their coverage to ‘employees’ or the ‘employment relationship’ without defining those
terms.”).
234. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (“ERISA’s nominal
definition of ‘employee’ . . . is completely circular and explains nothing. . . . Thus, we adopt a
common-law test for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ . . . .”).
235. Id. at 324–25.
236. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, supra note 73, §§ 1.01–.03. R
237. The Restatement also lists section 1.03 as an exception to the basic rule. See id. § 1.01(1)
(“[s]ubject to . . . § 1.03”). That section exempts controlling owners of an enterprise from the
definition of employee. See id. § 1.03. It is not relevant to college athletes.
238. Id. § 1.01(1)(a)–(b). Section 1.01(1)(c) also requires that the employer’s relationship
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§ 1.02 Volunteers
An individual is a volunteer and not an employee if the individ-
ual renders uncoerced services without being offered a material
inducement.239
College athletes are clearly employees under the basic rule of sec-
tion 1.01. Although the black letter rule is not very specific on this point,
the comments make clear that section 1.01(1)(a) is met when an
employer exercises control over the physical details of how an individ-
ual is to perform the services.240 College athletes are subject to highly
detailed control over how they perform their services.241 There is no
doubt that section 1.01(1)(b) is also met; the university clearly consents
to receive the services of college athletes. The Restatement discusses
nineteen examples that might present close calls on these two elements
of the basic definition.242 None of those examples remotely suggests that
college athletes would not meet the basic test.
College athletes would still not be employees, however, if instead
they were volunteers under section 1.02. A volunteer is an individual
who renders uncoerced services without being offered a material induce-
ment.243 Although the Restatement does not discuss college athletes in
particular, its discussion clearly indicates that they fit within the cate-
gory of individuals who receive a material inducement. A material
inducement is defined broadly to include any type of material gain,
including insurance and in-kind payments.244 Scholarship college ath-
prevents the employee from exercising entrepreneurial control over the manner and means by
which the services are performed. Id. § 1.01(1)(c). The employee would exercise such
entrepreneurial control if she could do things like hire and assign assistants and purchase and
deploy equipment. College athletes always meet this requirement for being classified as an
employee because they cannot exercise entrepreneurial control over the enterprise.
239. Id. § 1.02.
240. Id. § 1.01 cmt. d.
241. For a detailed description of the nature of this control, see Robert A. McCormick & Amy
Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81
WASH. L. REV. 71, 155 (2006) (concluding, somewhat more emphatically than I do, that college
athletes are employees under the NLRA).
242. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, supra note 73, § 1.01 illus. 1–19. R
243. Id. § 1.02.
244. Id. § 1.02 cmt. e. In the leading Supreme Court case on the issue, the Court considered
whether “associates” in a rehabilitation program run by a nonprofit religious organization were
“employees” under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. Most of the associates had been addicts,
derelicts, or criminals before their entry into the program. The Court held that “in-kind” benefits,
such as food, clothing, and shelter, were sufficient compensation (or “inducement” in the
Restatement’s formulation) to make them “employees” under the Act, even though the associates
themselves protested coverage. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,
304 (1985). For a similar case finding employee status under the NLRA, see Seattle Opera Ass’n
v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 763–65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (ten tickets to dress rehearsal performances and
modest one-time compensation to defray parking and transportation expenses sufficient
compensation to support employee status).
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letes would easily meet this requirement. For example, in his case, Col-
ter testified that he received more than $75,000 worth of inducements,
and Northwestern claimed that the inducements were far greater than
that.
In Comment g to section 1.02, the ALI addresses whether interns
and student assistants should be treated as volunteers or employees.245
The comment says that interns and student assistants should not be
treated as employees if they “work without compensation or a clear
promise of future employment” or if their work is uncompensated and
designed to satisfy requirements for graduation.246 But the comment
says that students are employees when they work for “more than educa-
tional benefits” so that their work “benefits the institution.”247 To illus-
trate this, the comment provides the following example:
A is a graduate student in biochemistry at university P. In order to
complete the degree requirements, A must work in a laboratory under
P’s auspices, either for pay or as a volunteer. A works in the labora-
tory of a professor, for which A is paid a yearly stipend and given full
tuition remission. The professor has secured grants to support the
research that A is assisting. A is an employee of P. P is providing A
with significant benefits both in order to further A’s education and
also to obtain A’s services on P’s funded research.248
Applying this lesson to college athletes means that they are employees,
not volunteers. Like A in the example, college athletes receive a yearly
stipend and tuition remission.249 Also, like A, college athletes are doing
work that “benefits the institution” beyond any educational benefits.
Indeed, college athletes are more clearly in the employee category than
A. For A, the work had to be completed to fulfill academic require-
ments. That generally is not true for the services provided by college
athletes.250
The Restatement makes clear that it is only attempting to restate the
245. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, supra note 73, § 1.02 cmt. g. R
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. § 1.02 cmt. g, illus. 10.
249. Cancino & Greenstein, supra note 178. R
250. One paragraph of the Reporters’ Notes is inconsistent with this. This paragraph says that
the courts have not found college scholarship athletes to be employees where their aid is limited to
the costs of their education. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, supra note 73, § 1.02 reporters’ notes R
cmt. g. This statement is both confusing and wrong. The statement is confusing because it is
inconsistent with the Restatement’s own example discussed above, which indicates that college
athletes are employees. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text. The statement is also R
wrong because “the” courts have not decided this. As discussed below, the courts are split. See
infra notes 252–55 and accompanying text. Given these problems with the Restatement, it is R
perhaps fortunate that Reporters’ Notes are the least authoritative of the three types of statements
in Restatements, following black-letter law and comments.
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principles the common law uses to determine employee status; the legis-
lature can change the underlying principles and, if it does, those princi-
ples would apply.251 This article cannot begin to survey all the tweaks
legislatures have made to these principles in every state across the broad
range of statutes protecting individual employment rights, and the out-
comes will not be the same everywhere under every statute. But, in gen-
eral, the first cut leans in favor of employee status for college athletes.
Under the common-law rule, as interpreted by the American Law Insti-
tute, college athletes are employees.
To illustrate, consider coverage of college athletes under workers’
compensation laws.252 Sometimes, coverage of college athletes under a
state’s workers’ compensation law will be clear and not dependent on
the common-law definition of employee. For instance, some state work-
ers’ compensation statutes contain language that expressly excludes col-
lege athletes from the statutory definition of employee.253 Conversely,
Nevada once expressly included scholarship athletes as covered workers
under its statute.254
Most states, however, do not fall into either of those categories.
Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance Association provides a good
illustration of the uncertainties and complexities that arise when courts
have to grapple with this issue in the absence of explicit guidance.255
Alvis Kent Waldrep, Jr., was severely injured in 1974 while playing
football for Texas Christian University (“TCU”).256 In 1993, he filed a
claim for workers’ compensation.257 The Texas Workers’ Compensation
Commission heard the case and awarded benefits to Waldrep.258 That
decision was appealed to a court and the issue of whether Waldrep was
251. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, supra note 73, ch. 1, intro. note cmt. a. R
252. For a more comprehensive review, see Frank P. Tiscione, College Athletics and Workers’
Compensation: Why the Courts Get It Wrong in Denying Student-Athletes Workers’
Compensation Benefits When They Get Injured, 14 SPORTS LAW. J. 137, 151–152 (2007).
253. For a clear exclusion, see CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(k) (West 2013) (“‘Employee’ excludes
the following: . . . [a]ny student participating as an athlete in amateur sporting events sponsored by
any . . . university or school, who receives no remuneration for the participation other than the use
of athletic equipment, uniforms, transportation, travel, meals, lodgings, scholarships, grants-in-aid,
or other expenses incidental thereto.”). For an exclusion that probably does the trick, see HAW.
REV. STAT. § 386-1(3) (2012) (“‘[E]mployment’ does not include . . . [s]ervice for a school,
college [or] university . . . if performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending
classes and in return for board, lodging or tuition furnished, in whole or in part.”).
254. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616B.182 (West 1997) (repealed 1999).
255. 21 S.W.3d 692, 697–98 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
256. Id. at 696.
257. An interesting aspect of the case is that it was not time-barred. The statute of limitations
in effect at the time did not begin to run until the employer filed an injury report with the workers’
compensation board. Since TCU never considered Waldrep an employee, it never filed an injury
report, so the statute of limitations never began to run. Id. at 696 n.7.
258. Id. at 696.
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an employee of TCU was presented to a jury.259 The jury found that
Waldrep had failed to prove that he was an employee.260 The Texas
Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s determination, holding that Waldrep
had failed to demonstrate that he was an employee as a matter of law.261
In its conclusion, the court said, “we are aware college athletics has
changed dramatically over the years since Waldrep’s injury. Our deci-
sion today is based on facts and circumstances as they existed almost
twenty-six years ago. We express no opinion as to whether our decision
would be the same in an analogous situation arising today.”262
Waldrep is a good illustration of the limited influence that any par-
ticular decision of employee status has in a case involving individual
employee rights. Although the case has been cited for the proposition
that courts have found college athletes not to be employees,263 that is
inaccurate because the actual holding is much narrower. The Waldrep
court only decided that the jury did not err in finding that Waldrep was
not an employee.264 It is possible that a jury verdict finding that Waldrep
was an employee would also have been upheld.265 Even so, the Court of
Appeals explicitly noted that its decision was based on college athletics
as they existed decades ago when Waldrep was injured, which, of
course, have changed dramatically since the time of the Waldrep deci-
sion.266 Moreover, consider earlier stages of the case. The Workers’
Compensation Commission itself held that Waldrep was an employee
entitled to benefits.267 And the trial court decided that Waldrep was not
excluded from coverage as a matter of law268 and, therefore, submitted
the issue of whether he was an employee to a jury.269 Thus, the ultimate
message from Waldrep is actually quite mixed and uncertain.
But even if the court had held that Waldrep was a non-employee as
a matter of law under the Texas workers’ compensation law, Waldrep’s
influence would still be limited. The court in Waldrep applied the defini-
tion of “employee” from the Texas workers’ compensation statute.270 To
259. Id. at 696–97.
260. See id. at 697.
261. Id. at 702.
262. Id. at 707.
263. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, supra note 73, § 1.02 reporters’ notes cmt. g. R
264. See Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 702.
265. The Court emphasized the stringent standards for reviewing a jury award—that it would
view the record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and uphold the verdict if it was
supported by “more than a mere scintilla of evidence.” Id. at 697.
266. Id. at 707.
267. Id. at 659.
268. The trial court had to hold this either implicitly or explicitly or the issue of employee
status would not have been submitted to the jury.
269. Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 696–97.
270. Id. at 698.
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be covered under that statute at the time, the work had to be performed
pursuant to a contract of hire under which the employer closely directs
the work.271 State workers’ compensation statutes vary in how they
define “employee.” In a different state, under a different statute, Wal-
drep would be largely irrelevant. Definitions of “employee” vary even
more widely if we consider the entire range of statutes protecting indi-
vidual employee rights. Waldrep provides even less guidance on
whether a college athlete should be classified as an employee under a
wage-and-hour statute or a state discrimination statute.
The limited impact of Waldrep also applies to other decisions deter-
mining employee status of college athletes under statutes protecting
individual employment rights. There are many arrows in the quivers of
those claiming employee status for college athletes under laws protect-
ing individual employee rights. One misfired arrow—as in Waldrep—
will tell us little about where the next arrow will land.
VI. IS COLLEGE ATHLETICS SPECIAL?
The standard definitions in employment statutes lean in favor of
classifying many college athletes as “employees.” However, universities
and the NCAA272 will claim that college athletics are different. They
will assert that even if the normal rules indicate coverage, applying those
rules to college athletes would create such havoc that special exceptions
should be carved out.273
Under antitrust law, the NCAA has had some success in forwarding
the claim that it is special. The NCAA is viewed leniently under antitrust
laws because college athletics is “an industry in which horizontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all.”274 In the leading case on this issue, the Supreme Court explained:
As Judge Bork has noted: “[S]ome activities can only be carried
out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is league sports. When a
league of professional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless
to declare their cooperation illegal on the ground that there are no
other professional lacrosse teams.” What the NCAA and its member
institutions market in this case is competition itself—contests
271. Id.
272. The claim of special status would be forwarded by the putative employer, which, in this
case, is the universities. But they will be supported by the NCAA. In this section, for ease of
explication, I will use the NCAA to represent both.
273. See, e.g., Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing
Student Athletes: Hearing Before the H. Educ. & the Workforce Comm., 113th Cong. 3-4 (2014)
(statement of Bradford L. Livingston, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP) (arguing that unionization of
college athletes is “unworkable”).
274. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
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between competing institutions. Of course, this would be completely
ineffective if there were no rules on which the competitors agreed to
create and define the competition to be marketed. A myriad of rules
affecting such matters as the size of the field, the number of players
on a team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be
encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all restrain
the manner in which institutions compete. Moreover, the NCAA
seeks to market a particular brand of football—college football. The
identification of this “product” with an academic tradition differenti-
ates college football from and makes it more popular than profes-
sional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for
example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character
and quality of the “product,” athletes must not be paid, must be
required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the “prod-
uct” cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institu-
tion adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a
competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed. Thus, the
NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its
character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which
might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions
widen consumer choice—not only the choices available to sports fans
but also those available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as
procompetitive.275
The general rationale here is that sometimes collaboration is neces-
sary, and necessary collaboration does not violate antitrust laws. The
case notes at least three aspects of necessary collaboration for college
athletics.276 First, on issues such as the size of the field and the number
of players on a team, a basic agreement must be reached to “create and
define the competition.”277 Second, collaboration may also be necessary
to ensure good and fair competition—to create a level playing field.278
Third, collaboration may be necessary to preserve the particular product
being marketed, which is a product tied to the academic tradition—col-
lege football as opposed to minor league baseball.279
275. Id. at 101–02 (citation omitted). For more recent cases, see Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d
180, 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that the NCAA eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust
challenge because they are not commercial and because they were necessary for “survival of the
product” and an “even playing field”); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344–1345 (5th
Cir. 1988) (eligibility rules survive rule of reason analysis because they are necessary to “create
the product” of college football). But see Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that NCAA policy on multi-year scholarships is subject to antitrust challenge, although
plaintiffs failed to make out a claim).
276. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02.
277. Id. at 101.
278. Id. at 102 (explaining that an institution that did not agree to the general rules might soon
find that “its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might be destroyed”).
279. Id. at 101–02.
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The first aspect is the easiest: Nothing—or at least almost noth-
ing—in employment law limits the ability of the NCAA to establish
rules that “create and define the competition.”280 We know this because
many sports leagues with employees exist, and they manage to create
and define their competitions just fine. The major professional leagues,
such as the National Football League and Major League Baseball, would
be obvious examples of this, but the examples extend down to the least
of the minor leagues. Moreover—keeping in line with the main thesis of
this article—even if it were possible to identify an employment law
somewhere that would interfere with this interest, an exemption from
that one employment law may be justified, rather than a global exemp-
tion from all employment laws.281
Collaboration may also be necessary to create a level playing field.
But, of course, there are many possible level playing fields.282 Again, we
know from the professional leagues that level playing fields can be cre-
ated in athletics even if the athletes are covered by the employment
laws. In general, application of employment laws has no necessary effect
on this. If all Big Ten universities are required to pay college athletes the
minimum wage, then there is a level playing field just as there is if all
are restricted to providing scholarships and stipends. Indeed, employ-
ment laws may contribute to a more level playing field than currently
exists. For example, uniform application of a minimum wage could
reduce current disparities in the benefits received by college athletes
between NCAA divisions or between the haves and have-nots of college
athletics.283
280. Id. at 101.
281. The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) of 1990 may be an example of a law that
could require reconsideration of some of the rules of the game. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213
(2012). But the Supreme Court has held that even that Act does not require any changes that
would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the game. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661,
683 (2001) (holding that the ADA required a professional golf association to permit a golfer with
a disability to use a golf cart during competitions because this did not fundamentally alter the
game of golf). As this illustrates and as noted in the text, other major sports organizations have
been able to maintain the integrity of their games even though they are governed by employment
laws.
282. I have not consulted Ramona Paetzold on this, but I have no doubt that the possibilities
exceed even those of possible bargaining units at Northwestern. See supra note 128. R
283. The NCAA forwarded competitive balance as a defense in the current antitrust action
against it over the use of the names and likenesses of college athletes in video games. Although
the judge did not grant summary judgment against the NCAA on the issue, she was highly
skeptical of the claim:
While [the NCAA] has asserted generally that allowing Division I schools to pay
student-athletes would lead to recruiting disparities between high-revenue and low-
revenue schools, . . . [it] has not provided any evidence to suggest that this is the
case. It has not explained, for instance, why the restriction on student-athlete
compensation would deter high-revenue schools from using their resources to gain a
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The third aspect of the collaboration rationale is the most difficult.
College athletics are, without question, a particular product that was cre-
ated and molded by the NCAA and its complex set of rules. It is true that
the application of some employment laws may interfere with the mainte-
nance of that particular product.284 However, even this claim does not
justify a global exclusion from employment laws. Some laws, such as
the minimum wage, may well interfere with the product.285 Classifying
college athletes as employees under other laws, however—such as the
NLRA—has no necessary effect on that product.286 But more pointedly,
employment laws often limit the products that can be offered. A league
defining its product as offering only white players would undoubtedly be
acting illegally regardless of how central the league claimed that feature
was to its product.287
Even beyond these particulars, the analogy to antitrust law as a
basis for an exemption from employment laws is weak. These rationales
under the antitrust laws are not really “exceptions”; instead, they are
applications of antitrust law.288 The claim is not that the NCAA is
exempt, but rather that the NCAA’s rules do not violate the basic
prohibitions of antitrust law.289 For employment laws, the claim would
be for an exception.
But if the antitrust analogy is inapt, then what should we make of
recruiting advantage in other ways, such as by building superior athletic facilities or
hiring better coaches. Nor has the NCAA explained why it could not use less
restrictive means of maintaining competitive balance, such as those used by
professional sports leagues.
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation (NCAA Name & Likeness
Case), No. C 09-1967 CW, 2014 WL 1410451, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014).
284. The Supreme Court noted, for example, that not paying players is an important part of the
product being marketed by the NCAA. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. More recently,
however, the judge in the Name & Likeness Case has been skeptical of this and similar defenses to
antitrust claims. NCAA Name & Likeness Case, 2014 WL 1410451, at *12–13 (expressing
skepticism that the NCAA’s limits on player compensation could be justified by its interests in
preserving amateurism or the integration of education and athletics; in protecting other sports,
especially women’s sports; or in increasing outputs such as the number of teams, players,
scholarships, and games).
285. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
286. Or at the least, the NCAA would have to bear the heavy burden of proving an adverse
effect on its product definition. See Richard T. Karcher, The Battle Outside the Courtroom:
Principles of “Amateurism” vs. Principles of Supply and Demand, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 47,
47–49 (2013) (discussing how the NCAA’s own varying definitions of “amateurism” make it hard
to say whether particular payments violate “principles of amateurism”).
287. A well-known case on this point is Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. 517 F. Supp. 292,
304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that an airline could not hire only female flight attendants even
though that was central to its positioning as the sexy “love” airline).
288. More particularly, they are justifications for evaluating the legality of collaboration in
league sports differently than in other industries.
289. It is worth noting that, in the leading case, the Supreme Court found that the NCAA was
violating antitrust laws. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98–101.
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the claim on its own merits—that the NCAA should not be covered by
employment laws because it would upend the entire NCAA regulatory
structure.290 Again, the first cut should be to investigate the conse-
quences of each particular claim of employee status. Recognizing a
union of Northwestern football players has no necessary effect on
NCAA compliance.291 Similarly, given that the NCAA permits health
insurance and encourages safety, workers’ compensation coverage is
mostly consistent with what is already permitted.292 While coverage
under some employment laws undoubtedly would have large effects on
the NCAA regulatory structure, coverage under others would not.293 A
global statement that any finding of employee status anywhere will upset
the whole apple cart is simply incorrect. To understand whether the
claim should be given credence, one needs to closely analyze the spe-
cific requirements of each particular employment law.
Having said that, however, coverage under some employment laws
clearly would conflict with the NCAA regulatory structure. How should
we think about those situations? I think the complications that arise
should be considered and treated seriously, especially by decision-mak-
ers such as the National Labor Relations Board who are empowered to
make policy-based decisions. (This is much less true for courts.)294 The
global exception claim, though, considered in a broad context, is a weak
one. The sets of laws we are talking about are central to American soci-
ety. Laws protecting collective labor rights, wage-and-hour laws, and
wage-payment laws are the present-day product of enormous social
upheaval and discussion in the first half of the twentieth century.295
Other laws—such as discrimination laws—are also indispensable pillars
of the social contract that we have constructed over the past half century.
Creating new exceptions to these important laws should be done very
290. In Colter’s case, for example, Northwestern has argued that recognizing a union would
interfere with the university’s ability to comply with Title IX while destroying the structure of the
Big Ten Conference and the NCAA and eliminating competitive balance in Division I football and
men’s basketball. Lester Munson, NU Might Be Protesting Too Much: Massive Effort to Discredit
Football Players’ Attempt to Unionize Seems Like Overkill, ESPN (Feb. 20, 2014, 11:28 PM),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10493443/massive-effort-northwestern-discredit-football-
players-attempt-unionize-seems-overkill.
291. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. R
292. See supra note 231. R
293. Id.
294. See supra notes 111–13, 207–11 and accompanying text. R
295. See, e.g., DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE
AGE 235–38 (1998); DAVID R. ROEDIGER & PHILLIP S. FONER, OUR OWN TIME: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LABOR AND THE WORKING DAY, at vii (1989); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW
2–4 (2004).
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cautiously, and not by the courts.296
Further, problems complying with employment laws are not unique
to the NCAA and college athletics. Compliance is complicated and
expensive for everyone. For better or worse, we as a society have
decided that those complications and expenses are worth it. Again, carv-
ing out an exception to avoid these complications for college athletics
should be done cautiously. It could be that the NCAA can prove that it is
a special case, which ought to be exempted from some of these laws.
Even then, the case would have to be made convincingly and individu-
ally for each particular employment law (and, again, generally before
legislatures rather than courts). But a global claim of exemption steps
too far.
VII. CONCLUSION
The main thesis of this article is that with a persistent effort, college
athletes are likely to be classified as employees sometime, somewhere.
The main reason for this is that there are simply so many arrows in the
quivers of those seeking employee status for college athletes. There are
literally hundreds of different statutory claims that could be made by
thousands of potential plaintiffs. A secondary reason is that the doctrine
in each of the major areas of employee rights—collective rights and
individual rights in both the private and public sectors—leans in favor of
those seeking employee status. These decisions are not likely to be
driven by doctrine alone, and doctrine can be modified, especially in the
face of powerful forces. However, doctrine is unlikely to be overridden
under every statute in every jurisdiction.297
An interesting aspect of this discussion about employee status for
college athletes is that the legal arguments do not depend on the broad
public policy claims made by either side.298 On the one hand, the out-
come of this issue does not depend on the often and loudly voiced
claims of those seeking employee status that the athletes bring in mil-
lions of dollars of revenue for universities, but are not paid much.299 The
level of revenue generated by college athletics300 and the amount of
296. See supra text accompanying notes 207–11. R
297. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. R
298. Richard Karcher has recently documented the extent of the increased revenues. For
example, between 2004 and 2012, football revenues at the top ten universities (in 2012 dollars)
increased by an average of ninety-eight percent. See Karcher, supra note 286, at 21–22. R
299. Id.
300. The level of revenue generated by college athletics is irrelevant to the employee-status
issue because it focuses on the wrong flow of money. The employee-status issue depends on the
flow of money from university to student athlete. See supra notes 37–39, 243–50 and R
accompanying text. But the level of revenue received by universities depends on a different flow
of money—the flow to universities for the product of college athletics. Just as the profit or loss at
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compensation the college athletes receive301 are both largely irrelevant
to the legal issue of whether they should be classified as employees. On
the other hand, the claims and fears of those opposed to employee status
that such a finding would upend all of college athletics as we know it are
also largely irrelevant. As I have discussed, some findings of employee
status, including the one forwarded by Kain Colter, do not present any
direct conflict with the current structure of college athletics.302 Other
kinds of claims, such as wage payment or minimum wage claims, could
have a large effect.303 But in either event, those consequences are not
central to the legal issue of employee status under current doctrine.
The state of affairs that I describe has been present for decades. So
my claim raises the issue of why there might be a persistent effort now
when there has not been one in the past. Looking back, college athletes
have always been dissuaded from pursuing Colter-like claims by a com-
plex and powerful set of disincentives: college athletes are young and
inexperienced; the culture is one of cooperation and teamwork; the
opposing forces—both the universities and the NCAA—are large and
seemingly impervious; and each potential Colter is a college athlete only
for a short time. While those factors are still all present, they are begin-
ning to be outweighed by significant change in other aspects of college
athletics. This change is being driven by two main developments. First,
although largely irrelevant legally,304 the explosion of revenues into the
coffers of universities participating in big-time college athletics has
caused discontent. College athletes simply do not see themselves as get-
ting their fair share.305 Second, there is increasing concern about the
long-term health effects of athletic participation, particularly in foot-
ball.306 In combination, these developments mean that college athletes
General Motors does not affect whether its workers are employees or not, this flow of money does
not affect the employee status of college athletes.
301. As noted above, to be an employee rather than a volunteer, one must receive a “material
inducement.” See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text. But this sets a very modest lower- R
bound amount, not a higher-bound one as suggested by the comparison with the significant
revenues generated for universities by college athletics.
302. See supra notes 147–48, 201–02, 285 and accompanying text. R
303. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. R
304. See Karcher, supra note 286, at 21–22. R
305. This is consistent with the findings of behavioral economics that people are motivated by
concern about the fair division of revenues. In the “ultimatum” game, for example, A is given a
set amount of money and can offer as much as she wishes to B. If B agrees to the division, both
get to keep their sums; if B does not agree, neither gets anything. This oft-repeated experiment
demonstrates that B’s in this experiment will turn down “unfair” small shares of money even
though it means they will end up with nothing. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489–90 (1998). In our context, these results
imply that college athletes may be increasingly inclined to reject the offer made to them by
universities because their shares of the total revenue are declining.
306. See, e.g., U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEAD’S UP: CONCUSSIONS IN
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are increasingly a less satisfied lot than they have been in the past.
Regardless of whether for these reasons or others, college athletes
are beginning to forward their interests more aggressively. Kain Colter’s
union election petition is only one of many examples. Andrew Oliver, a
former baseball player at Oklahoma State University, won a case chal-
lenging an NCAA rule.307 Ryan Hart, a former quarterback at Rutgers
University, filed a suit seeking compensation for the use of his likeness
and biographical information in a video game.308 Similar suits were filed
by Sam Keller, a former football quarterback at the University of
Nebraska, and Ed O’Bannon, a former basketball player at the Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”).309 In 2011, more than 300
then-college athletes at five schools (Arizona, Georgia Tech, Kentucky,
Purdue, and UCLA) signed a petition asking the NCAA to allocate more
of the revenues from its television contracts directly to college ath-
letes.310 At least two national organizations (CAPA and the National
College Players Association (“NCPA”))311 are actively seeking to orga-
nize college athletes. All of these activities occur in the midst of grow-
ing concerns—and litigation—over the long-term health effects of ath-
letic participation.312
Colter is in the first wave of this new activism by college athletes.
His actions will encourage others to come forward. Organizations like
CAPA and NCPA can organize these efforts and increase the likelihood
that they will be successful. However, strategic organization is not nec-
FOOTBALL, available at http://www.cdc.gov/concussion/HeadsUp/pdf/Football_Fact_Sheet_
Coaches-a.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (stating that all concussions are serious and, “[w]hen in
doubt, sit [it] out”); Christopher C. Giza et al., Summary of Evidence-Based Guideline Update:
Evaluation and Management of Concussion in Sports, 80 AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY 2250,
2251–53 (2013) (football is a risk factor for concussions and no evidence exists that any treatment
enhances recovery or reduces long-term consequences). See also Jeanne Marie Laskas, Game
Brain, GQ (Oct. 2009), http://www.gq.com/sports/profiles/200909/nfl-players-brain-dementia-
study-memory-concussions (describing problem of concussions in professional football).
307. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 218–19 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2009). The court enjoined
enforcement of the NCAA rule, but later vacated its order when the parties settled.
308. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013).
309. The suits were consolidated. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013). The video game producer recently
settled, but the case continues against the NCAA. See generally NCAA Name & Likeness Case,
2014 WL 1410451.
310. Dan Wetzel, Bowl Boycott Would Shock Unfair System, YAHOO! SPORTS (Oct. 24, 2011,
11:35 PM),  http://sports.yahoo.com/news/bowl-boycott-shock-unfair-system-033500454—ncaaf
.html.
311. The home page of the National College Players Association is at http://www.ncpanow
.org.
312. See Judge Fears $765 Million Not Enough, ESPN (Jan. 15, 2014, 7:31 PM), http://
espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10292549/judge-rejects-preliminary-approval-765-million-nfl-settle
ment-concussion-case (reporting that judge failed to approve a proposed settlement of concussion
claims by 20,000 retired professional football players).
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essary; the only necessity is persistence. And since any individual col-
lege athlete anywhere can make a claim for overtime pay, workers’
compensation coverage, or union representation, persistence can occur
naturally and haphazardly. These waters are going to continue to rise.313
The NCAA’s current strategy in the face of these developments is
to make changes at the margins, in the hope that it can maintain the
general structure of the current system,314 while staunchly resisting the
efforts of Colter and others in an effort to stave off transformational
change.315 This article suggests that the NCAA strategy should also
include careful consideration of how to react when some college athletes
313. The size of potential damage awards could also keep the waters rising. Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, for example, college athletes could recover double any wages that would be
due for a period of two or three years before filing suit. Since the compensation provided by
universities probably does not qualify as “wages,” this would mean a recovery of double the
minimum wage for every hour worked up to forty hours in any week, and triple the minimum
wage for every overtime hour. These numbers can add up pretty fast. Considering only
Northwestern football players and using very conservative estimates (no overtime, time worked
within NCAA limits, etc.), a successful suit would yield damages exceeding $700,000, not
including attorneys’ fees. Suits under the Fair Labor Standards Act have resulted in large damage
awards and, because of that, have been an area targeted by plaintiff-side labor attorneys. See
GERALD L. MAATMAN, JR., SEYFORD SHAW LLP, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION REPORT 3–4 (2014), available at http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/2014-class-
action-report (reporting on a rising tide of wage-and-hour class actions).
314. The changes under consideration by the NCAA in response to these developments are not
well directed at the employee-status issue. Some of the suggested changes merely increase the
benefits flowing to college athletes, which makes them seem more like employees and less like
other scholarship students. See, e.g., NCAA Committee Approves Expanded Meal Allowances for
Athletes, NCAA.COM (Apr. 15, 2014, 9:32 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2014-04-
15/ncaa-committee-approves-expanded-meal-allowances-athletes (permitting universities to
provide unlimited meals and snacks to college athletes). At the same time, other changes under
consideration do tend to re-emphasize their status as students rather than athletes. Jeff Barker,
NCAA Considering Adding ‘Dead Periods’ to Help Students Focus on School, President Says,
BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 5, 2014, 6:38 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/terps/bs-sp-terps-
ncaa-mark-emmert-0306-20140305,0,117176.story (reporting the NCAA President’s
announcement that NCAA may require universities to provide college athletes with periods where
no athletic activities can occur, even informal ones). Still other changes would seem to have no
effect one way or the other on the employee-status issue. Student-Athlete, AD, Faculty Rep Would
Have Votes on Proposed New Board, NCAA.ORG (Mar. 25, 2014, 2:52 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/media-center/news/student-athlete-ad-faculty-rep-would-have-votes-proposed-
new-board (proposing a new governance structure that would increase the autonomy of the major
athletic conferences). The NCAA is a large and multi-faceted organization facing a set of
pressures that extend well beyond the Northwestern case, so this lack of focus on the employee-
status issue is understandable. However, it does complicate their strategy.
315. One interpretation of baseball history is that a major transformation occurred because of a
strategy of legal mobilization analogous to that being pursued by Colter, CAPA, and others. See
Christopher W. Schmidt, Explaining the Baseball Revolution, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1471, 1473
(2013); see also Donald H. Yee, In the 2020 College Football Season, Will Your Favorite Team
Still Exist?, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-the-2020-
college-football-season-will-your-favorite-team-still-exist/2014/04/04/f24a5c16-b9d9-11e3-96ae-
f2c36d2b1245_story.html (speculating that Colter’s litigation and similar efforts could lead to the
development of a minor league football system, similar to the system used in professional
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somewhere are recognized as employees for some purposes. Because
someday, sooner or later, one of these arrows is likely to hit the bull’s
eye, and the NCAA should be prepared.
baseball, where football players leaving high school would have an option to forgo college and
move directly into professional football).
